THE GUTS TO TRY: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-scene Desert Commander, by retired Col. James H. Kyle, Orion Books, 352 pages, $21.95.

When recalling the failed 1980 rescue mission to free 53 Americans held hostage in the U.S. Embassy compound in Iran, most people remember the tragic helicopter accident that killed eight servicemen, but not the reason the mission was aborted.

In “The Guts to Try” retired Col. James H. Kyle, the on-scene commander of Operation Eagle Claw, explains the entire rescue operation in a simple, organized manner. Not only does he explain what went wrong, but he also tells the reader why he believes the mission should have suc- ceeded.

While most armchair strategists believe the mission failed because President Jimmy Carter sent in only eight helicopters, Kyle suggests the number of helicopters was sufficient, but that the use of the communications equipment could have been better. Kyle also faults the planners for not informing the rescue team about the limitations of the weather forecasts.

For those who don’t remember details of the planned two-day mission, a synopsis of the Desert 1 portion of the operation is in order. The plan called for eight RH-53 helicopters to fly from the USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman on April 24 to a predetermined site in Iran called Desert 1. Before the arrival of the helicopters, three MC-130s carrying 139 members of the operation, and three EC-130s carrying 18,000 gallons of fuel for the helicopters would land at Desert 1 and set up for the refueling mission that would enable the helicopters to continue under the cover of darkness to a secret location from which the rescue would be carried out the next evening.

Before the helicopters were due to arrive, two of the planes returned to Oman to make room for the helicopters at Desert 1.

The helicopters, flying at low altitude and in radio silence, were 140 miles into Iran when the first sign of trouble appeared. The blade warning lights flashed in the No. 6 helicopter, forcing the pilot to land the craft so he could perform an inspection. It was determined that the craft was no longer airworthy, so the crew abandoned the helicopter and were picked up by helicopter No. 8, which because of the rescue fell 15 minutes behind schedule.

The helicopter force now numbered seven and encountered the first of two haboobs, areas of suspended dust. This greatly reduced visibility and the temperature inside the helicopters increased to nearly 100 degrees. The pilots said flying into the haboob was like flying into talcum powder or milk.

After entering the second haboob, helicopters No. 1 and No. 2 turned back and landed in a clear area. After the crews assessed the situation the two helicopters re-entered the second haboob and were now 35 minutes behind the new lead helicopter. At this point the No. 2 helicopter lost its second-stage hydraulic system, but continued to Desert 1. Meanwhile, helicopter No. 5 began to have trouble with its flight instruments and the crew, one hour and 20 minutes from Desert 1 and nearly 30 minutes away from clearing the second haboob, decided to return to the Nimitz. Now the mission had only six helicopters on the way to Desert 1. It had been determined that six helicopters were needed at Desert 1 to continue the mission.

The six remaining helicopters finally made it to Desert 1, but much behind schedule. Upon landing it was determined that the hydraulic pump in the No. 2 helicopter was burned out, and Ed Seiffert, the helicopter mission commander, said it would be unsafe to use it.

With only five helicopters left, the mission was canceled and the troops had to prepare to withdraw. By this time everybody was upset that after months of training it had come to this. Everybody wanted to proceed, but it seemed that the equipment had failed them. Since the helicopters were late, the tankers were running out of fuel and had to expedite their exit from Iran. While moving the No. 3 helicopter out from behind the No. 4 tanker it crashed into the plane, causing a giant explosion. Eight servicemen were killed and a few were injured. It was decided to abandon the helicopters and fly everyone out on the remaining three tankers.

Although some members of the mission believed the Desert 1 portion was the most difficult part of the operation, the second night was no cakewalk. The second part of the mission was extremely complex and involved having commandos capture an Iranian airfield, getting the Delta squad to the embassy, freeing the hostages and transporting them to a nearby soccer stadium. The freed Americans then would be taken by helicopters from the soccer stadium to the captured airfield, board planes and fly out of Iran.

It’s important to remember that if everything went as planned on the first night, nothing is to say that problems would not have arisen during one of the complex stages the second night. The mission, the book states, needed at least five helicopters to transport the Americans from the soccer stadium to the captured airfield. If there were only four helicopters, a risky return flight would have been needed to pick up the remaining people at the stadium.

Despite all these complexities, the mission commanders believed the operation as planned could have succeeded. Kyle suggests that all eight helicopters could have made it to Desert 1. He says helicopter No. 6 could have made it despite the blade warning. He says the warning in that model helicopter was not a sufficient reason to abort. Kyle said there were no reported accidents associated with the warning in the Navy RH-53D helicopter. The Marine version of the craft, however, had been involved in only three crashes as a result of continued flight after the blade warning lights indicated a problem. The fault here, Kyle said, was that the crews didn’t know the operating limitations of their aircraft. He admits, however, that it was a judgment call whether to continue in the No. 6 helicopter.

Copter No. 5 also should have continued, Kyle said. If the helicopter could fly back to the Nimitz, it certainly could have made it to Desert 1. He said the crew broke radio silence to notify the Nimitz that they were returning. Instead, Kyle said, the crew should have broken radio silence to obtain information that would have prevented the abort. Why not find out that they would clear the haboob in 25 to 30 minutes and complete the mission, instead of informing the Nimitz of their return? Kyle also suggests that the pilot had exceeded his authority when he turned around.

The No. 2 helicopter, which made it to Desert 1, was abandoned after an examination of the hydraulic pump showed that continuation would be unwise. Kyle says some pilots with whom he had talked since suggested the helicopter “could have been flown on just one hydraulic system, observing certain precautions.” Those precautions involved important aspects of the mission, including weight limitations.

Kyle says that in all three cases the safest course of action was taken, but “collectively, their actions caused the mission to be aborted.” He believed that the mission never had fewer than seven flyable helicopters the first night, and some “highly experienced helicopter pilots have told me that all eight helicopters” should have made it to the final destination that evening, with the five best helicopters completing the mission on the second evening.

Kyle’s book is an interesting and accurate account of the mission. Although it’s not the only account of the mission available to readers, his book offers an insider’s perspective on the operation. Kyle sheds light on the operational restrictions that he believes were unwarranted, the CIA’s role including a secret reconnaissance flight to Desert 1 in March 1980, and the capture of a busload of Iranians who happened to drive through Desert 1 as the mission was under way.

At a time when most Americans are in awe of the U.S. performance in Operation Desert Storm, this account shows that not all operations go as planned and some have major weaknesses that unfortunately come to light when it is too late.

Jim Emple is an editor on the NEWS copy desk.