Nuclear-power costs rose with the paperwork level

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Second of three parts During the year 1979 Maine Yankee delivered to the electric grid about 4.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy at a cost of 1 cent per kilowatt-hour. In just this one year the savings to the electric consumer exceeded $100 million. The…
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Second of three parts

During the year 1979 Maine Yankee delivered to the electric grid about 4.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy at a cost of 1 cent per kilowatt-hour. In just this one year the savings to the electric consumer exceeded $100 million. The total employment at the plant in Wiscasset was less than 100 people. Some engineering was done by Yankee Atomic in Bolton, Mass., while some accounting and purchasing was done by CMP in Augusta.

All told, fewer than 200 people did all the work to operate, maintain and manage the plant. A year ago, while the plant was shut down for repairs, the Maine Yankee staff was greater than 500 and more than that number of outside contractors were also at the site. The projected cost per kilowatt-hour was pushing 5 cents.

What happened? Two things: On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear plant did its thing, and on March 4, 1996, Time carried a cover story on “Blowing the Whistle on Nuclear Safety.” The first event forced the commission of a study group (The Kemeny Report) focusing on operating procedures, operator training, use of simulators, proper display of information, etc. The changes following this study did not have a major cost impact.

In 1986 Maine Yankee generated more than 6 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy at a cost of less than 2 cents per kilowatt hour. Replacement power was 6.4 cents per kwh. That year, the operation of Maine Yankee saved the consumer $240 million.

The big blow to the industry came with the Time magazine assault. Each nuclear plant operates on a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Imbedded in this license is a “Final Safety Analysis Report” containing millions of words, and tens of thousands of drawings. As any nuclear plant matures, new methods, materials and operating procedures are developed. The NRC is always “on site” and as far as I know nothing is ever done behind their back.

But then the inevitable happens: during a refueling procedure at a Northeast Utilities nuclear plant, a slight accident damaged a worker’s protective boot. An employee reported the event as contrary to the rules. The procedure used (along with dozens of others) was a violation of the initial licensing agreement. Shirley Ann Jackson, recently appointed chairman of the NRC, used this event as a “wakeup call.” All plants must be brought into compliance with the licensing agreement.

According to an April 11 piece in the Wall Street Journal, the Millstone 3 nuclear plant must submit “tens of millions of documents.”

U.S. nuclear technology has an excellent safety record. Ships of the U.S. nuclear navy have steamed over 100 million miles, and logged 4,500 years of reactor operation without a reactor accident. If we include the world-wide experience with U.S. nuclear technology, more than 12,000 years of operation are in the log books without demonstrable off-site health effect. Ten years after the Three Mile Island accident, the pressure vessel was cut open. Much to the surprise of everyone, engineers discovered that about one-half of the core had melted, but the pressure vessel was not close to failure. Given this experience, the big dome associated with nuclear plants seems unnecessary. These nuclear plants are tough old birds.

Martin Malsch, retired deputy general counsel, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said some astounding things in an interview with the publication “Nuclear Energy Insight”: “The agency (the NRC) has too many requirements … thousands and thousands of requirements governing plant operations … they all look the same. There is no distinction in terms of safety significance.” “The agency wants to regulate its licensees at some margin above adequate protection, but the agency has never defined what that margin is … the approach has been — we will know it when we see it.” This uncertainty forced the owners of Maine Yankee into the shut-down decision.

The regulatory rules for the airlines, telecommunications, railroads etc. emerge from court cases brought by the industry. Mr. Malsch explained this is not the case with rules used by the NRC. “The disputes have almost always been between the NRC and the anti-nuclear groups.” What a thing to admit! The rules used by the NRC are driven by people with the hope of closing the industry!

Given this regulatory environment and cheap (at the moment) natural gas no one will invest in the next generaion nuclear plant.

Richard C. Hill of Old Town is a professor emeritus at the University of Maine.


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