When Operation Allied Force was taking flight three weeks ago, Congress was taking off for its long spring break. Members paused in packing long enough for the usual fretting about national interests, presidential resolve and exit strategy. Followed by the perfunctory “nevertheless, we support our brave men and women being sent into harm’s way.”

Now Congress is back and, to its credit, the fretting has largely given way to the realization that this is not an internal political dispute but a rampage by genocidal maniac and his army of thugs. Good questions are being asked: When and how will the inevitable deployment of ground troops be conducted; is NATO’s goal to make peace with Slobodan Milosevic or to vanquish him; is Kosovo to be a protected province or an independent state.

And along with these reasonable demands for straight answers from NATO and the White House comes, via some of President Clinton’s most bitter Congressional critics, a monumentally bad idea — a declaration of war against Yugoslavia.

Worse than the idea itself is the timing. The air campaign has been slow and grueling. The combination of weather, terrain and the experience of the Serb forces never promised an overnight Desert Storm-style victory, but the day-and-night pounding is taking its toll. Milosevic’s marauders may be days away from crumbling, perhaps weeks, but crumble they will — unless the NATO alliance crumbles first. NATO remains remarkably united, but that unity would evaporate with a declaration of war.

Worst of all, there’s the Russia factor. The change in Russian position in this conflict has been subtle but unmistakable. The sabre-rattling, the threat of intervention on Yugoslavia’s side, the specter of World War III; all that has subsided. Despite the mixed messages it has sent, Russia knows its future lies with the West, not with Milosevic. It remains the most likely intermediary, the best broker for peace. It craves the opportunity to save face after backing a regime now exposed as criminal. Its troops could be crucial to the success of an eventual peacekeeping force. All that will be lost when the United States declares war on Yugoslavia.

Those who would unleash the hounds, principally Sens. Jesse Helms and Ben Nighthorse Campbell, are less interested in getting tough with Milosevic than they are in embarrassing Clinton. True, the American president’s strategy at first seemed to be little more than wishful thinking that something large, heavy and highly explosive would hit the Yugoslav president on the head, but making a point about having a wishy-washy commander-in-chief is a poor excuse for declaring war. And for wrecking NATO. And for re-creating the Eastern Bloc.

There is one positive side to this war talk; a renewed interest in the War Powers Act. Congress fought for this 1973 law, it overrode a presidential veto, it insisted it must authorize the involvement of American troops in engagements lasting beyond 60 days. And it has studiously ignored the law, and ducked the responsibilities it entails, ever since. Anyone can be a fretting armchair general. Everyone wishes the troops well. Only Congress has the constitutional prerogative to make war and the law requiring it to take a stand in conflicts not rising to the level of war.