Russian reality

Sticking points remain, legalistic language must be defined, but the emerging agreement on the Russian presence in Kosovo seems to strike a fair balance between public recognition of Russia’s role in forging peace and an unspoken acknowledgment of its inability to be much more than bystander.

The likely outcome will be for Russia to have a “zone of responsibility” within one of the five NATO peacekeeping zones. While a far cry from Russia’s once-intractable demand that it have sole control of a zone, it is a realistic compromise for a collapsed superpower with a pre-collapse ego.

The insertion of Russian paratroopers into Kosovo before the Serb withdrawal even began alarmed NATO, but it cheered the Russian public; it is being hailed as the most popular act of President Boris Yeltsin’s administration. Growing unrest with the perception of being shoved around by NATO in general and the United States in particular has been quieted by this modest show of assertiveness.

At the same time, the condition of the Russian paratroopers that took control of Pristina airport was telling: underfed, underequipped and unpaid, they had to beg, not buy, drinking water from NATO forces. At $7 billion, Russia’s annual military budget is one-fortieth that of the United States; experts estimate that more military equipment sits idle for lack of parts than is operative. At home, troops beg in the streets for food, officers moonlight as cab drivers and security guards. In ravaged Kosovo, there will no such eking opportunities. It is inevitable that some of the humanitarian aid pouring into Kosovo will go to sustain the Russian peacekeepers.

As if to underscore Russia’s military decline, Chechen rebels renewed their attacks on Russian troops along the border of the breakaway region Friday, just as the NATO negotiations neared resolution. If Russia cannot control an impoverished territory that has no functioning government, it is logical to question whether it will be of any value in controlling the Kosovo Liberation Army.

The value of the Russian presence in Kosovo has nothing to do with the KLA; the value is on the home front. Russia is a shambles. The economy is a wreck, even the once-vigorous black market is in recession. Billions in foreign aid has disappeared without a trace; the corruption is so deep that the word “kleptocracy” had to be coined to describe Russia’s current form of government.

The primary beneficiaries of this decline are the ultra-nationalist Russian politicians who long for the good old days of the Cold War. If a Russian zone of responsibility can keep those destructive forces at bay, help rekindle Russian pride and start the rebuilding of an entire society, the extra mouths NATO will have to feed are a small price to pay.