As the U.S. Navy court of inquiry into the USS Greeneville accident enters its second week, the testimony continues to reveal a tragic sequence of mistakes, miscalculations and miscommunications that led to the American submarine ramming the Japanese fishing vessel Ehime Maru and the loss of nine lives. In the end, the Navy’s determination of exactly what happened off the coast of Hawaii on Feb. 9 will be less important than its explanation of how it could have happened.

The Navy’s handling of the matter thus far does not promise a full and forthright explanation. Details have trickled out with a maddening slowness that cannot, despite high command claims, be attributed to due process considerations. This pattern started immediately after the incident with the Navy withholding that 16 civilians were aboard the submarine and that two were seated at key control positions during the emergency-surfacing drill. These circumstances were confirmed only after they were revealed by the National Transportation Safety Board, which is conducting an independent investigation.

VIP trips are common and some hands-on experience for the visitors is routine. In this particular case, it is information that is highly embarrassing, but covering it up serves no legitimate purpose in protecting the rights of either perpetrator or victim. With this foundation, and in the context of a warship ramming a commercial fishing training vessel with high school students on board, it is no wonder that the outraged Japanese public doubts the Navy’s sincerity when it pledges to do all that is possible to raise the sunken vessel and to meet its full civil liability obligation.

The first week of the court of inquiry offered dim prospects for improved candor. The proceeding opened with a straightforward reminder that Naval tradition holds the captain of a ship ultimately responsible for all that occurs onboard and this captain -Cmdr. Scott Waddle – seemed to be accepting that responsibility by hand-delivering letters of apology to the Japanese consulate and by meeting with the families of the dead. Now, Cmdr. Waddle agrees to testify only if granted immunity for anything he might say on the stand and the focus of blame has shifted from the top officers to one lone enlisted man, a technician who failed to complain loudly enough that the 16 civilians packed into the control room prevented him from doing his job properly.

As the inquiry wears on, details continue to trickle. The seas were choppy that day; so choppy, some now say, that even a 190-foot vessel like the Ehime Maru might not been seen by periscope. Sonar equipment had been configured so the guests could listen to whale songs and not fully reconfigured for surface listening. Too much time had passed between the last scan for surface ships and the commencement of the surfacing maneuver. Most damaging of all is testimony that fear of reprimand kept subordinate officers and enlisted personnel from raising these valid concerns with their superiors. That is what the Navy must explain, and what it must end.