Missile defense: shields vs. swords

President George W. Bush has announced that he intends to move forward quickly with development of a national missile defense (NMD). He has offered no specifics on his plan, no cost estimates, and has not included any provision for NMD in his budget. Yet, before we allocate any more money for this project, we need answers to these questions:

Can missile defense technology be proven to work reliably and consistently? Is NMD a proportional response to a credible threat? Will the system improve our overall national security? What are its costs, and how will it be paid for?

Here’s what we know so far. Hitting a missile with a missile poses enormous, perhaps insurmountable, technological challenges, including the task of distinguishing decoys from warheads. The president would invest in this new system despite repeated test failures. He also wants to speed up deployment of an interim ship-based system, thus skipping essential testing.

We know that even if this shield works, it would be full of holes. NMD is intended to detect, intercept and destroy isolated ballistic missiles fired by accident or by “rogue” nations before they hit their target. The system would be defenseless against cheaper, untraceable and more likely non-missile ways to deliver weapons of mass destruction by these same enemies. A recent Mike Peters cartoon mocks this fatal flaw: “This system,” a general says to an aghast Mr. Bush, “is guaranteed to stop anything except, of course, some wacko with a nuke in a Ryder truck.”

Moreover, like any shield, NMD will encourage the building of more swords. Our allies rightly fear missile defense will provoke a renewed race to develop offensive arms that can overcome the system.

The administration’s plan, to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty first and come up with details of a missile shield second, is the most antagonistic of all possible approaches with Russia. Instead, we should negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty with Russia. Unilateralism and abandonment of arms control through multilateral, verifiable treaties will undermine the very stability and security NMD purports to enhance.

Finally, and of most immediate concern, we know that the NMD’s staggering cost inevitably would drain funds from other programs. Particularly vulnerable are other military projects. With rumors that the DD-21 program may be shelved, and an expected Navy budget that cuts DDG-51 procurement, New England shipyard workers may soon feel the effects of this crusade for missile defense. Indeed, as the president’s massive tax cuts take effect, deficit spending or painful cuts in existing domestic programs may also be necessary to pay for missile defense.

When President Clinton advocated a limited NMD, I voiced similar concerns. I am now more skeptical of the wisdom of proceeding, particularly on the hasty timetable the President has suggested.

President Bush has embraced a more ambitious proposal, which swells NMD’s estimated cost from $60 billion, for a ground based system, to at least $100 billion, for one that adds sea and space based components. These funds are not in the President’s own 10-year budget. It is irresponsible for the administration to ask Americans to invest in a concept without being forthright about its costs to taxpayers.

I want to know why at the same time President Bush is urging missile defense aimed at “rogue” nations, he has terminated negotiations to end the ballistic missile program of one such nation. The Clinton Administration began talks with North Korea after that nation’s provocative 1998 missile test.

The resulting moratorium on testing has held to this day. We need to build on this progress, not turn our back on diplomatic success. For that reason, I recently proposed a Special Coordinator for Korea in the U.S. State Department. That official would be charged with seeking to reduce or eliminate North Korea’s ballistic missile program, as well as stopping exports of missile technology.

I have also proposed legislation to require the president to seek financial contributions for missile defense from those allies and friendly nations the president says will benefit from this system. As the administration tries to sell allies on the benefits a system that does not yet exist, the United States should be honest that they will have to bear some of the burden, too.

The strategic policy announced by President Bush appears to be based on ideological dogma rather than a sound assessment of our security needs. Let’s debate the scope and shape of a national missile defense before we abandon treaties and approaches that have kept us safe for decades.

Tom Allen is the U.S. representative for the 1st District of Maine. He serves on the House Armed Services Committee.