Moving toward-and beyond-a smart border

Canadians took some time to recognize that the events of Sept. 11, 2001 have forever changed the United States-Canada border. But now they know. For Canada, keeping the border open to the legitimate flow of people and – especially – goods in the face of deepening economic integration has become the paramount priority.

Since Sept. 11 Americans have become increasingly sensitive to border security, principally regarding travel, visas, immigration, refugees and potentially dangerous goods. These concerns affect our relationship with Canada more than with any other country. Canada has taken initiatives of its own. For example, it has tightened its refugee system, especially concerning the 70 percent of its refugee claimants who enter from the United States. Canadian passports are becoming harder to falsify. Noncitizen permanent residents (called “landed immigrants”) are receiving new tamper-resistant identity cards. Technology permitting, Canada soon may require noncitizens to carry biometric cards with embedded fingerprints or retina scans. Similar cards for all Canadians are under consideration. As in the United States, this last proposal faces public and political opposition because of its perceived “big brother” aspects.

Most of Canada’s anti-terrorism initiative has involved cooperation with the United States along our 7,065-mile border. Prime Minister Jean Chretien designated Deputy Prime Minister John Manley as Canada’s counterpart to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge. By all accounts Manley and Ridge have developed a close working and personal relationship. Their joint Smart Border project includes Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) to cooperate in guarding the border and to help law enforcement, intelligence and border enforcement agencies exchange information. Most of these units are now operational.

The Canadian government asserts that they already have disrupted criminal networks attempting to smuggle illegal migrants (not necessarily terrorists) across the border. Finally, the two countries have undertaken studies to determine the feasibility of joint or shared facilities at certain border crossings across the continent. These include four in Maine, at Calais, Easton, Monticello and Vanceboro, to complement joint customs arrangements at Halifax, Montreal, Newark and Vancouver. Overall, Canada has budgeted more than $5 billion CDN to enhance security at its borders. To date, the Canadian public has accepted these border initiatives without worrying about Canada’s sovereignty.

Unfortunately for Canada, the current joint ventures have not been enough for the United States. Congress has passed a law, called the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act, to require entry and exit controls for every person and all goods crossing the border. As the new law stands, all persons entering or leaving the United States will be logged into and out of the country by the end of 2005. Some of them (young men apparently of Middle Eastern ancestry perhaps?) will be fingerprinted and photographed. The Canadian government considers ethnic profiling improper, and it fears the law will slow border crossings unacceptably. Canada has asked Secretary of State Colin Powell for a blanket exemption from the new rules. It is unlikely to get one.

Much worse for Canada’s economy, other American legislation will require truckers to provide up to a full day’s notice of commercial shipments into this country by late this year. The trucking industry protests this is unworkable, especially in the highly integrated auto industry where companies routinely issue rush orders on short notice to their factories on both sides of the border with no regard to whether a shipment must cross the border. The new Free and Secure Trade program (FAST), now operational at six of the busiest border crossings, may alleviate these inconveniences to some extent. Under FAST, low-risk companies that use these crossings frequently may apply for special expediting privileges. None of the FAST crossings are in New England. The similar NEXUS single alternative inspection system offers express clearance to individual travelers who cross the border frequently at a few high-volume crossings.

Neither NEXUS nor FAST reassures Canada’s business community. Led by the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Canadian Trucking Alliance, business interests have lobbied Ottawa to negotiate a perimeter policy with the United States. They hope the American government will exempt Canadians from border controls if the two countries create a North American perimeter by upgrading their existing free trade pact to a customs union with a common external tariff, and implementing similar (if necessary, identical) policies on travel, visas, immigration and refugees.

Canadians seem genuinely divided on Canada’s relationship with the United States. Some lament that Canada is acting like a “fading power” that has lost much of its prestige, credibility and clout in foreign affairs. They fear that Canada invests too little in its military and infrastructure maintenance. Others cite Prime Minister Chretien’s alleged failure to establish a good personal relationship with President Bush. They argue that American policy-makers will respect Canadian positions on trade, border security and other matters only in a climate of trust between the prime minister and president.

Others disagree. They insist that Canada retains the moral authority, international reputation and economic strength needed to influence other countries. But trade and border security must contend with powerful American business lobbies that seek to limit imports that compete with their products. Because Canada recognizes the connection between trade and border security, the two governments eventually may combine them into a single integrated strategic plan. Any ambitious package will raise alarm among Canada’s nationalists, but the power disparity will convince most Canadians to set aside their reservations. They will want to maintain a relationship that now supplies 86 percent of Canada’s trade and nearly 40 percent of its gross domestic product. All in all, the freer movement of goods, services, capital, technology and possibly (in time) workers across the border, with or without a formal perimeter policy, will acknowledge Canada’s dependency and vulnerability in its post-Sept. 11 relations with the United States.

Howard Cody is an associate professor of political science and Canadian studies at the University of Maine. This commentary was excerpted from the current issue of the Maine Policy Review published by the Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public Policy at the University of Maine. To view the entire article, visit www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm.