Reassessing postwar strategy in Iraq

The suicide attack against the United Nations compound in Baghdad raises three important questions. First, who delivered the attack? Second, why was the U.N. targeted? Third, what impact will this attack have on the coalition’s attempts to transform Iraq into an American-style democracy?

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack and it may not. Whether al-Qaida cells, Baathists or some other Islamist groups are responsible is an important question, but one that can be put aside for the time being. What is important is that there is an increase in the sophistication of such attacks. Bombings of the U.N. offices and the Jordanian embassy, two weeks ago, show that groups executing these attacks are well organized and have the resources to inflict significant harm against their enemies.

Many decision-makers and experts have been surprised by the attack against the U.N. headquarters. Why should they be? The Bush administration has made it clear that the United States wants to establish an American-style democracy in Iraq as a first step to reform other governments in the Middle East. Before the war started, the U.N. was highly critical of U.S. efforts. Many people and countries, including in the Middle East, were happy to see the world body stand against the United States and what many saw as an illegal war. But, after the Iraqi regime was toppled, the U.N. agreed to work with the coalition, easing criticisms of the coalition’s strategies or objectives.

After the bombing, President Bush said people who fear progress and hate peace carried out the attack. He also said that the U.N.’s efforts in Iraq were “purely humanitarian.” Bush’s comments on the U.N.’s role are inaccurate. Although the U.N. is administering humanitarian efforts, under the authority of Security Council Resolution 1483, it also plays an important political role.

Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was killed in the bombing and served as the U.N. special representative, played an active and significant role in the creation of the Iraqi Governing Council in July. His participation gave credibility to a process that many considered undemocratic as the Coalition Provisional Authority, headed by U.S. diplomat L. Paul Bremmer, handpicked its members. Vieira de Mello was instrumental in convincing the Security Council and Middle Eastern countries to support and not undermine IGC’s work.

Seen from this perspective, the attack on the U.N. was not only an attack against progress, as Bush said, but against outside forces that are deciding Iraq’s future. While it is clear that a minority of Iraqis condone recent attacks against the international presence, there is growing resentment with the coalition’s efforts and its inability to provide security and basic services. The current situation in Iraq should not be characterized simply as a battle of good vs. evil or civilized vs. barbarians. It is a battle for the future of Iraq and the Middle East. In many ways, it is primarily a fight for Iraqis’ hearts, minds and soul and increasingly a fight over what moral values and political principles will be used to organize Middle Eastern societies.

This puts the coalition in a very difficult spot. Now, it has to clearly pursue a war on terrorism, while also trying to gain the Iraqis’ support. Already Bremmer is making the case that terrorists are entering Iraq via Syria, showing the need for a stronger approach against Iraq’s neighbors. This means that many of the coalition’s resources will have to be diverted to increase security, to secure Iraq’s borders, to destroy terror organizations moving into or developing in Iraq, and to continue the search for Saddam Hussein and his cronies. The coalition’s efforts are costing American taxpayers $4 billion a month. This is likely to rise, as growing instability will scare off investors and will force many countries to rethink their willingness to send troops to Iraq. More important, if violence increases, relief organizations will be forced to pull out their personnel, leaving Iraqis to fend for themselves.

Now more than ever, the Bush administration must put politics aside and reconsider its current strategy in Iraq. The priority should not be to create an U.S. protectorate that can be used to expand American power in the Middle East. A new strategy must put at center stage Iraqis’ welfare to assure their support for the reconstruction process and to prevent them from assisting groups using violence against the coalition and other international bodies. This strategy should also be built on the principle of core competency. In this way, the United States would focus its efforts in areas where it has the most expertise, such as in military matters, while the international community, spearheaded by the U.N. in political and social issues and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in economic ones, assumes control for civilian efforts.

Internationalizing postwar efforts is the best way for the United States to secure a stable Iraq, while reducing some of the financial burden associated with this mission. The U.N. building’s bombing, as well as other attacks against infrastructure and coalition troops, clearly shows that the U.S. strategy is failing to meet its main objectives. The United States is slowly losing the battle for Iraqis’ hearts, minds and souls, allowing extremists to challenge U.S. interests and garner more support among Iraqis and other people throughout the Middle East.

Carlos L. Yordan, Ph.D. is a visiting assistant professor of government at Hamilton College and a visiting scholar of peace studies at Cornell University. He has taught at the University of Maine (2000-01) and Husson College (1999-2000).