COMPETENCE IN COURT

In a Supreme Court ruling last spring that said those accused of a serious crime could be forced only under certain circumstances to take medication to make them competent to stand trial, the dissenting minority worried about the effect the ruling would have during the middle of trials. A Maine case recently stepped back even further, before the trial was held at all.

The Supreme Court dissent in Sells v. the United States, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, said allowing an appeal mid-trial would create all kinds of difficulties. “If [the ruling] is applied faithfully (and some appellate panels will be eager to apply it faithfully),” the justice wrote, “any criminal defendant who asserts that a trial court order will, if implemented, cause an immediate violation of his constitutional (or perhaps even statutory?) rights may immediately appeal. He is empowered to hold up the trial for months by claiming that review after final judgment ‘would come too late’ to prevent the violation.”

U.S. District Court Judge Gene Carter ruled recently in Maine that Theodore Miller, accused on a firearms charge after being found outside the Bush family estate in Kennebunkport last year, cannot be forced to take medication that would make him competent to stand trial because his case did not meet at least one of the standards described in Sells – that the government show an important interest in bringing the defendant to trial. Mr. Miller did not take his medication so he remained under observation at the medical wing of the Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, N.C. He will stay there indefinitely, according to news reports, though had he been found guilty his likely prison term would have been two years or less. He has been in custody for 14 months.

Without a medical guardian to make decisions for the accused, he may remain there for far longer than what his punishment would demand. Ron Honberg, the legal director of National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, said it is possible he could stay indefinitely and that, further, anyone not competent to stand trial, a low measure of competence, would unlikely be competent to live independently and so might be better off facing civil commitment.

This limbo presents an uncomfortable situation for the justice system. The Maine case may not be a good example, but it is easy to understand the lack of resolution for the victims in a case held up by mental incompetence. For the accused, a person may serve far more time precisely because he is incompetent, whether guilty or not, than a competent and guilty person.

The fact that these possibilities, however rare, exist suggests how far the courts have to go in addressing its understanding of mental competence. Sells is much more likely only the latest, rather than the last word, on this topic, and the Supreme Court should be eager to add further definition to what constitutes fairness for both victim and accused.