LITTLE ROOM TO JUMP

The best political strategies anticipate three or four moves ahead, preparing for what will happen after the layers of reactions are revealed. President Bush may have been thinking of this wishing he could step back a couple of moves when he found himself scolding the president of Taiwan over what appears to be a domestic issue.

Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian is seeking a “defensive referendum” in March, at the time of the presidential election, to demand that China remove thousands of missiles it has pointed toward Taiwan – which understands that China will do no such thing no matter what the results of the referendum. So why have it and risk provoking its very large, well-armed neighbor?

President Chen offers reasons that touch on the respect for the democratic process, the fact that the referendum is not a provocation toward independence and that neither he nor his Democratic Progressive Party has any intention of moving toward independence unless China attacks. Just about everyone else assumes President Chen concluded the referendum was needed for political reasons: He was substantially behind in the polls before suggesting the popular referendum and is now in a dead heat for re-election.

Despite President Chen’s apparent intentions and assurances, Beijing said it felt provoked and called on the Bush administration, which has been strengthening ties to Taiwan, to condemn the planned vote. This forced President Bush to choose between the two, and he did it carefully. Without demanding the referendum be cancelled, he said with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao sitting nearby, “The comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”

This, in turn, put President Chen in a difficult position: Does he keep the referendum and push the United States closer to Beijing or does he cancel it and lose face? And it puts the United States in another potentially uncomfortable position: If Beijing is going to consider itself provoked by every clearly domestic move made in Taipei, how can all three sides maintain the status quo they say they desire? The United States has indebted itself to Beijing for its help with North Korea and is concerned about China’s position as a U.S. creditor, an opportunity created by rising deficits. It cannot allow itself the luxury of pleasing Beijing by condemning Taiwan without pushing that small democracy into a less secure stance.

The United States has accepted a “One China” policy since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Given the certain U.S. preference for one type of government over another, it too is a difficult position. And it will become even more difficult if the United States jumps even a little each time Beijing demands it.