The United States invaded Iraq a year ago amid a mix of support and suspicion at home, outrage abroad, objections at the United Nations, with a single substantial ally and the apparent belief that U.S. troops would be greeted as liberators. Even the small majority of support from the U.S. public, according to polls at the time, was produced by the misunderstanding the invasion was part of a response to the terrorism of Sept. 11. An appraisal of whether the war has been successful recalls the famous comment by Chou En-lai when asked by Henry Kissinger about the importance of the French Revolution. “It’s too soon to tell,” Premier Chou replied.

Some things are known about the Iraq war. The cost to date, for instance, is thousands of Iraqi lives, 574 Americans and 100 allies killed and thousands wounded. Obviously, one of the goals has been met: Saddam Hussein is out of power and under U.S. guard. Other goals have been more elusive. The intelligence reports selected by the Bush administration did not accurately depict the level of WMD and, therefore, the threat of Iraq to the world. Some weapons may eventually turn up, but likely not to the extent or level of readiness asserted by the administration. Similarly, the link to terrorism, though it may have been present, does not now appear as strong as had been described so that its removal likely won’t produce the hoped-for benefits.

The most interesting question is the remaining goal: Will the Iraqi people, guided by the United States, establish a healthy and enduring democracy of any flavor? Will its new government represent rule by the people; will its elected leaders commit themselves to justice and equality? It’s too soon to tell. News reports relate numerous instances of a growing tendency by Iraqis to blame Americans for the lack of security, the feeble economy, crime. It is difficult to conclude whether these reports are recording the nascent signs of a broad anti-U.S. movement or the natural reaction of a people that wants stability, peace and prosperity, but if it is the former, what does this mean for future relations?

The Brookings Institution has kept a detailed quality-of-life index for Iraq over the last year, measuring everything from the top 55 Baathists still at large (currently 10) to the number of schools reopened (all of them, as of last fall) to the daily potable water supply (21.3 million liters, compared with 13 million pre-war) and the electricity supply (4,088 megawatts in February vs. 4,400 megawatts pre-war). The unemployment rate for the last couple of months has been 45 percent. The index has also kept track of the average daily number of attacks on U.S. troops, which have dropped from a high of 50 last September to about 19 now. The number of troop deaths, wounded, suicide bombings and helicopters lost among much else is down collectively from last fall, but the fighting certainly hasn’t stopped.

It is also too soon to tell what the war means to the United States’ reputation worldwide. Certainly, the Bush administration is trusted less by European countries – especially the populaces of those countries – than any previous administration in recent memory. The notion of pre-emptive war is reviled. At the same time, President Bush seems to have changed course on the idea that the United States can act unilaterally. He and Cabinet members are more likely to stress the need for international cooperation now – just as allies are more reluctant to provide it. This tension is especially important in Iraq, where the combined troop contributions of the allies make up a small minority of the total and the United States has found that assigning its own troops to Iraq for long periods is both hard on the troops and limits responses in other areas.

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One idea that evaporated in the heat of the first weeks of battle last year was that the United States was too reluctant to accept casualties of any level – the debate over the former Yugoslavia was the last example of this. The most remarkable story of the Iraq war, in fact, may be the American public’s patience with a war that has been so costly, to their sons and daughters and monetarily.

Abroad the feeling is less kind. Shibley Telhami, a professor of foreign policy studies at the University of Maryland, reported at a recent Brookings review of Iraq that a year ago an Arab world survey showed little trust in what the United States said, most surveyed believed the Middle East would become less democratic and that it would experience more terrorism. “The first year after the war,” he said, “has reconfirmed people’s suspicions and expectations.”

A further point worth emphasizing: While the United States looks at Middle East issues through the lens of terrorism, the Middle East views it through Arab-Israeli relations. This difference creates a conflict of goals that cannot be easily solved.

The Iraq war was not the flower-strewn success the administration predicted and it is not, post-war, the unmitigated horror its opponents sometimes describe. It is very much a lengthy commitment to democracy, a commitment more deadly than Americans imagined and one it seems willing to stick with for months to come.