Without meaning to, the United States has converted Fallujah into a haven for insurgents and terrorists. A truce agreement negotiated after a six-week siege of the Sunni city of 285,000 handed control to a 1,200-strong force called the Fallujah Brigade, led by generals from Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard.

Surrounding U.S. Marines have been ordered to stay out and may not even shoot back when fired at. Members of Saddam’s Baathist party are said to be plotting a return to power over the entire country. In the meantime, terrorists reportedly are loading cars with explosives and sending them off to Baghdad, 45 miles to the east, for continuing suicide bomb attacks. These reports can’t be confirmed, since news reporters have been forbidden to enter the city. But U.S. military leaders take them seriously.

Things could change, of course. The Financial Times said this week that the Fallujah Brigade was about to be merged with the new Iraqi army. But the information came from a moderate Islamic political leader who may not be able to speak for the hard-core insurgents still loyal to Saddam Hussein.

For the present, the situation is a totally unacceptable stalemate.

How did this mess come about? It started with the killing and mutilating of four American contract employees last April. U.S. Marines responded by invading the city in a furious battle. Inevitably, Arab television carried horror pictures of civilian casualties. The Marines were prevailing and believed they could bring the city under control in three to five days. But orders came from Washington to call off the offensive for fear of igniting fresh violence throughout the country and further inflaming the Arab world.

The New York Times quoted Iraq’s director of National Intelligence, Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, as saying that the Americans and the new Iraqi government could defeat the Fallujah insurgents, but only at great cost. He said, “We could take the city, but we would have to kill everyone in it.”

The U.S. forces, barred from resuming their offensive, have resorted to frequent airstrikes against supposed safe houses for insurgency leaders. They are thought to include Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the mysterious strong man believed to be orchestrating the guerrilla attacks from a hideout in Fallujah. The new Iraqi army may eventually be able to settle the matter without U.S. help, but recruitment and training could take years to reach that point.

Fallujah must not become a microcosm of all of Iraq. Yet what began as a seemingly simple deposing of a hated dictator and a reception by welcoming crowds has turned into a long struggle against a spreading guerrilla force. Military strikes create civilian casualties and help make new recruits for the insurgency. American soldiers on the ground naturally resent orders to back off. Political leaders are wary of further backlash from military action.

Any optimism must rely on the development of a stable, popular Iraqi government with the power and will to unify and rule the country. But that happy prospect, if achievable at all, lies far in the future. In the meantime, the war that was started based on flawed intelligence has saddled the United States with a military involvement that could last for years.