No recent phrase has gotten as much attention as the “16 words” that President Bush uttered during his 2003 State of the Union address in the runup to the Iraq war. In that speech, the president said: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

Political pundits have parsed these words and, depending on their party affiliation, concluded that the president was absolutely right or absolutely wrong. Now, with the release of a review of the intelligence community by the U.S. Senate and a corresponding report from the British government, the president’s words appear to be largely correct. However, it remains a leap from a four-year-old attempt to get uranium to an imminent threat.

Both reviews agree that it is accepted that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999. Since uranium is Niger’s largest export, British intelligence concluded that the visit was for the purpose of acquiring the material used in nuclear weapons. This conclusion was “credible,” according to the British intelligence review. The report quickly clarifies that there was evidence that Iraq sought uranium, not that it actually purchased any.

The U.S. intelligence review is not as decisive. Although it was “reasonable for analysts to assess that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa,” the Senate report concludes that “the Central Intelligence Agency’s comments and assessments about the Iraq-Niger reporting were inconsistent and, at times contradictory.”

The Senate report says the United States first became aware of the Niger uranium claims in 2001. The CIA reported that a foreign intelligence service indicated Niger intended to ship several tons of uranium to Iraq. At the time, analysts in the U.S. intelligence community found this report “very limited and lacking needed detail.”

The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research deemed the report “highly suspect,” while other intelligence agencies labeled it “possible.” In 2002, the CIA included the Niger uranium claim in a report. The claim was then repeated in a Defense Intelligence Agency report that was read by Vice President Dick Cheney. After he asked for more information, the CIA sought to find it. An agency employee suggested that her husband, a former ambassador to Gabon who had previously worked in Niger, could investigate the situation.

Former Ambassador Joseph Wilson was ultimately sent to Niger in February 2002. He concluded that there was “nothing to the story” that Niger was diverting shipments of uranium to Iraq. Still, the Niger claim persisted, in various forms, in intelligence reports despite warnings from the deputy director of central intelligence and National Security Council staff that the British claim about Iraq seeking uranium from Africa being “overblown.”

As a side note, Ambassador Wilson became an outspoken critic of the Bush administration’s justification for the war in Iraq and the subsequent naming of his wife, a CIA operative, by a columnist is now the subject of a government review. Although some have criticized Mr. Wilson’s wife for offering her husband’s service, the Senate Intelligence Committee said it “did not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA employee traveling to Niger. The committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate, considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available.”

Rather than definitively settle the matter, the two reviews show that even with regard to the Niger claim the intelligence remains unclear. Even if the 16 words are generally accurate, the larger picture they were used to paint is not.