Two reports on the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq come to the same conclusion: The abuses were the result of major leadership failures, not the actions of a small band of rouge soldiers, as Pentagon officials had long asserted. Both reports, released this week, have the same shortcoming, however. They fail to hold the military’s top brass accountable for these failures.

The first report to be made public, known as the Schlesinger report after the head of the panel, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, termed the prison outside Baghdad an “Animal House.” “There was chaos at Abu Ghraib and sadism on the night shift,” Schlesinger said during a Tuesday conference releasing the Defense Department commissioned report.

The blame for much of this was laid at the feet of Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, then the top U.S. commander in Iraq. The report said Gen. Sanchez failed to adequately supervise interrogation techniques and other policies at several prisons in Cuba, Afghanistan and Iraq. The report also criticizes Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for inadequate supervision and for not acknowledging and correcting the situation sooner. However, the report did not say these officials should be reprimanded, disciplined or made to resign.

The second report, done for the Army by Maj. Gen. George Fay, also concludes that leadership failings, lack of discipline and confusion at the prison led to the abuses. The Fay report spreads the blame to additional low-ranking soldiers and implicates intelligence personnel and civilian contractors. No Army officers are expected to face criminal charges as a result of that report either.

It is hard to understand why seven military police soldiers who worked under leadership failings, a lack of discipline and confusion are now facing criminal charges while those who created such a situation are likely to not be disciplined at all.

Ken Davis, a former Army reservist, is asking the same question. A member of the 372nd Military Police Company, he says he witnessed some of the abuse at Abu Ghraib. The seven soldiers charged in the scandal were in the 372nd. Mr. Davis has tried to persuade his Army superiors and members of Congress that it was intelligence personnel who directed the abuses, according to The Washington Post.

“It seems they want to sacrifice seven soldiers for the sins of everyone,” he told the paper. “Whoever led them down that path is a culprit as well.” Mr. Davis and others have said that military intelligence personnel, not military police, were in charge of the interrogations and abuse that resulted.

Sen. Susan Collins, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has it right when she says: “I strongly believe that those responsible further up the chain of command should be held accountable. [I]t would be unfair if only the low-level prison guards were punished when the various reports identify individuals … responsible for creating the conditions that allowed the abuse to occur and for failing to exercise sufficient leadership.”

The reports did part of the job by identifying those responsible for the failures. It is now up to Sen. Collins and her colleagues, as well as the Pentagon, to reform the system so that such failures are not repeated and, as necessary, to discipline those who failed.