Forget the idea that North Korea is a hermit dictatorship, ruled by a mysterious and invisible throwback to Stalinism, who wants nothing to do with other nations, is driving his people into famine and economic collapse and plans to blow up his neighbors even if that means his own destruction. That’s the old North Korea of a few years ago, or at least a caricature of it. And it formed the basis for the Bush administration’s plan for dealing with the very real threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

President George W. Bush came into office loathing (to use his word) the country’s national leader Kim Jung Il and assuming he was dealing with a crazy man. The Bush plan for dealing with North Korea was to squeeze it with economic sanctions in hopes of collapse and regime change, isolate it diplomatically, and build new small nuclear weapons that could penetrate North Korea’s arsenal hidden in caves – all intended to make it abandon its program to develop nuclear weapons.

The Bush plan hasn’t worked, partly because a new North Korea is emerging. As a New York Times correspondent reported recently, instead of isolating North Korea the United States risks finding itself isolated. North Korea is reaching out to other countries, and many are responding with growing commercial and cultural interaction.

Britain, Germany and Sweden all have opened embassies in Pyongyang, the capital, although some other countries are waiting until North Korea demonstrates respect for human rights. Kim Jong Il is edging his country toward a market economy. Relations with South Korea are improving.

In the face of this changed situation, the Bush administration has softened its position, but only slightly. For the first time, it offers economic and security benefits if North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons program. But the latest U.S. proposal is front loaded in U.S. favor. It provides that North Korea must first close down its nuclear plants, and only then will the United States grant a still-unspecified security guarantee and consider granting also-unspecified economic aid. North Korea wants direct bilateral talks with the United States. Mr. Bush insisted on six-nation talks (involving both Koreas, the United States, China, Russia and Japan).

It is a classic deadlock. The Bush administration thinks North Korea is simply stalling in hopes of a John Kerry victory in November and has no intention of abandoning nuclear weapons. North Korea thinks the United States is simply hoping for North Korea to collapse and, if that doesn’t happen, planning a military attack.

Since neither side trusts the other, the only diplomatic solution appears to be negotiations not based on trust. Pyongyang last year proposed step-by-step bilateral negotiations. Each side would start with a concession – a statement by North Korea expressing willingness to quit its weapons program and resumption of energy and food aid by the United States. If that worked, further concessions could be made until finally North Korea would scrap its weapons program and the two countries would reach normal diplomatic and economic relations.

Too rosy a scenario? Maybe so, but at least it would point the way toward a possible solution.