FEAR & NUKES IN NORTH KOREA

President Bush and his Democratic rival John Kerry seem to be competing for who can scare American voters the most about possible North Korean nuclear weapons. Mr. Bush listed the country with Iraq and Iran as members of an “axis of evil” and thus as potential targets for pre-emptive attack under his preventive war doctrine. Mr. Kerry, in a recent political blast, accused the president of letting a “nuclear nightmare” develop, although he differed from the president in advocating a return to direct one-to-one negotiations, which the Bush administration abandoned when it took office.

Two developments have suddenly injected North Korea’s nuclear program into the American presidential race. First came a series of intelligence reports suggesting to some experts that North Korea was preparing to conduct its first test explosion of a nuclear weapon. Then came a huge explosion near North Korea’s border with China and initial reports of a “mushroom cloud,” the signature sign of a nuclear explosion.

But Pyongyang has now said it was a deliberate detonation to demolish a mountain as part of a plan for construction of a hydroelectric dam and has offered to permit foreign envoys to inspect the scene. U.S., British and South Korean officials seem to have accepted that explanation. But North Korea’s nuclear program remains a hot U.S. election issue.

One of the cooler heads among the American specialists on North Korea has just finished an analysis that explains North Korea’s motivations and offers hope for a peaceful solution that either President Bush or a President Kerry can pursue if they can shake off the scare tactics of the hawks in both parties. Selig S. Harrison, a Washington-based scholar who recently returned from North Korea, has been writing the analysis at his summer home on Islesford for presentation at a conference at Lake Como, Italy.

Based on his many discussions with North Korean leaders, Mr. Harrison concludes that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons not for leverage against its neighbors or to reduce the need for costly conventional weapons but because of fear and insecurity. He quotes former defense secretary William Perry as saying that North Korea seeks to deter the United States from attacking: “We do not think of ourselves as a threat to North Korea, but I fully believe that they consider us a threat to them.” Mr. Harrison says that North Korea began serious efforts to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles as a direct response to the 30-year U.S. deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Negotiations now are stalled over a Bush administration accusation that North Korea has begun secret work on an enriched-uranium bomb in addition to its acknowledged development of a plutonium-based weapon. The U.S. position is that North Korea must first admit that it has been conducting the alleged secret project. Mr. Harrison says that North Korea may be using low-enriched uranium for power production and that producing high-enriched, weapons-grade uranium is far more difficult and expensive.

The administration has yet to provide supporting evidence about the uranium charge to Congress or to allies in Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing or Moscow, he adds, concluding that he believes the administration exploited limited intelligence to head off Japanese and South Korean overtures to North Korea.

Mr. Harrison advocates deferring the uranium issue and focusing on the plutonium issue until greater trust has been developed though step-by-step mutual concessions.