Caught between a public, including the families of the 9-11 victims who wonder why it takes Washington three years to reform an intelligence system that failed them, and the powerful friends of the Department of Defense, the Senate this week moved forward thoughtfully with an overhaul of the nation’s intelligence community. It should keep moving, with a justifiable fear of losing all momentum for reform if it were to wait another year, as is being suggested.

Senate leaders Republican Bill Frist and Democrat Tom Daschle handed the job of reform to the Governmental Affairs Committee in late July, which subsequently held eight hearings through August. For such a major reworking of a crucial government function, that would seem rushed, but this case is unusual because the work is based on nearly two years of testimony, research and conclusions by the 9-11 Commission, further strengthened by an in-depth set of hearings and report by the Senate’s Select Intelligence Committee – there is nothing hasty about the current legislation.

Its need, though, is urgent. One of the most telling paragraphs of the 9-11 Commission report describes the CIA’s increasing awareness six years ago of a growing terrorist threat. “On December 4, 1998, [Director of Central Intelligence George] Tenet issued a directive to several CIA officials and his deputy for community management, stating, ‘We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside the CIA or the Community.’ The memorandum had little effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community.”

That sounds like a problem of workforce quality, not something that can be changed by appointing an overall head of the intelligence community, as a bill by Sens. Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman would do. According to the report, however, the structure in this case failed too: “The NSA [National Security Agency] director at that time, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, believed the memo applied only to the CIA and not the NSA, because no one had informed him of any NSA shortcoming.”

Despite the work and the need, former defense secretaries, Senate Appropriations leaders, Henry Kissinger and others cautioned against proceeding this year.Clearly, the overhaul would shift some of the budgetary authority and control Defense now has over intelligence, but the Collins-Lieberman legislation carefully differentiates between intelligence to be shared among government agencies and tactical intelligence, which would remain with Defense.

An amendment by Sen. Mark Pryor would have the Government Accountability Office review progress of the reform after two years. Expanding that to years one and two, with the understanding that limited modification was possible depending on the results, could reassure those who question that path of the reform.

But to wait until next year signals that the failures of 9-11 – and of finding WMD in Iraq – are nothing to be alarmed about, that protecting the current order is more important than preventing a repeat of these events. That should be unacceptable to the Senate.