SHIPPING UNCERTAINTY

The premise of a federal program to ensure the safety of cargo headed to the United States was simple: Companies that certify they are meeting security standards will have their shipments inspected less. The problem, according to the Government Accountability Office, is that the certification comes before companies prove they have met security requirements. As a result, the program may actually be making it easier to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist materials into the United States.

Pre-certification must be stopped until companies can demonstrate that they are following security procedures necessary to keep contraband off their ships and out of their shipping containers. Customs and Border Protection must play a larger role in defining what security procedures are required.

The goal of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is to spend less time inspecting cargo that poses little risk to the United States. This makes sense. Each day, 27,000 cargo containers enter the country. Less than 1 percent of U.S.-bound cargo is inspected by the customs service before it leaves port.

When the program began in November 2001, companies were given the benefits of C-TPAT as soon as the government received their agreement to participate in the voluntary program. Security profiles submitted by potential member companies were not reviewed, according to the GAO. In February 2004, the customs service changed its policy to grant benefits only after security profiles were reviewed. Still, benefits are granted before companies undergo a validation process, which is meant to ensure that security measures are in place.

As a result, there are currently more than 7,300 partnership members, more than half of which have been certified. Of the more than 3,744 certified, only 409 have been validated. That means 90 percent of participants are enjoying benefits, which include fewer inspections and shorter border wait times, before the government has determined they are qualified to participate in the program.

Even for the small percentage of companies that have been validated, the GAO found that the process was weak. It appears that security standards are negotiated between the company and the government. Worse, the office said, validation often focused on the wrong areas. In one instance, a company that primarily ships products from Asia had its Central American facilities inspected. Other files were incomplete.

“This is very troubling to me,” said Sen. Susan Collins, chair of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. A subcommittee held a hearing on this issue last week. “If in fact it is a hollow program, then oddly enough that increases our vulnerability.”

That’s because partnership participants have their cargo checked much less frequently than nonmembers. Containers shipped by participants are checked once every 306 times instead of once every 47 times. This increases the risk that determined terrorists could smuggle weapons and chemical agents into the United States.

This is an unacceptable risk that must be met with stronger security requirements and more oversight of the cargo program.