The Islamic Republic’s ninth presidential election June 17 has Iranians debating whether they should participate in or boycott the contest. The eight candidates represent distinct options within the political spectrum, albeit limited by the vetting procedures of the conservative-controlled Guardian Council. But the most significant aspect of this election is the fact that a major personality of Iranian politics, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has decided to enter the race.

Perhaps more than any other candidate, Rafsanjani’s camp insists this seasoned politician, with his revolutionary credentials and long-standing experience in the Islamic Republic’s labyrinthine factional struggles, is the only man who can reinvigorate the economy, resolve the nuclear dispute with the West and normalize relations with Washington.

However, as much as Rafsanjani’s election is a foregone conclusion, the United States and Europeans should not pin their hopes on Rafsanjani.

Lacking significant popular backing and considered an ideological chameleon by enthusiasts and detractors alike, Rafsanjani would find dealing with the parliament’s ultra-conservative majority tough. Neither the legislature nor Khamenei has much sympathy for Rafsanjani’s ideological flexibility, striving to preserve their own vision of doctrinal purity. Refraining from openly endorsing one candidate, the Supreme Leader, himself appointed rather than popularly elected, would be more amenable to those whose loyalty to conservative principles is not in doubt.

Iran’s leadership claims its legitimacy rests on divine sovereignty yet has established mechanisms for popular participation in decision making. They permit semi-competitive elections but jealously guard their power, seemingly unbothered in the short run by the contradiction between popular and divine sovereignty. This paradox has at once ensured the Islamic Republic’s survival and produced gridlock in the national discourse, as decisions over nuclear technology may soon demonstrate.

A Rafsanjani presidency would not necessarily break this impasse and may actually aggravate contradictions and conflicts within the system. If past promises and results are any indication, Rafsanjani cannot easily run on the record of his two-term presidency in 1989-97. After some initial socio-economic liberalization, his administration could not trim Iran’s unwieldy bureaucracy nor cut its red tape enough to attract foreign investors. Rafsanjani could not capitalize on either the Bush or Clinton team’s subtle overtures to restore ties with the United States, and by the time he left office, all EU states had withdrawn their ambassadors from Tehran, charging Iranian agents of assassinating dissidents in exile.

More importantly, Iran and its regional context are far different today than during the 1990s. Conservatives have now re-captured most government power centers, and some in the second Bush administration and in Congress have advocated the policy of regime change be applied to the Islamic Republic. With U.S. troops next door in Afghanistan and Iraq, any Iranian president can afford to take little for granted.

Thus, before turning to Iran’s domestic issues, whoever is elected will have to defuse the nuclear stand-off with Washington and its European allies – the most serious foreign policy crises for the Islamic Republic since its war with Iraq. With international opposition intensifying, even an official of Rafsanjani’s stature and shrewdness may not be able to persuade the Iranian citizenry that abandoning the quest for nuclear weapons technology is in the country’s long-term interest.

According to one survey, more than half of Iranians support the nuclear program and 46 percent are strongly behind it. Living in a dangerous neighborhood and seeking recognition as a regional powerhouse, neither Iranian citizens nor officials have much incentive to change this policy, while international pressure may strengthen the Islamic Republic’s already recalcitrant conservatives.

So, before addressing the domestic agenda, whoever is elected will have to defuse the nuclear stand-off with Washington and its European allies – the most serious foreign policy crises for the Islamic Republic since its 1980-1988 war with Iraq. With international opposition to the Islamic Republic’s quest for nuclear weapons technology intensifying, whoever is elected in Iran does not have an easy task ahead of him.

He will face the same entrenched resistance to change from conservatives who see political and economic reform endangering the Islamic system and their own interests, while at the same time he may encounter greater pressures from the Bush administration. As we have learned from eight years of Khatami’s presidency, Iran is unlikely to transform itself overnight. The process of change in Iran will be slow, and will evolve according to one’s internal dynamic.

Dr. Bahman Baktiari is director of the International Affairs Program at the University of Maine.