Just before the mayor of New Orleans blamed Washington, and the governor of Louisiana did the same, followed by members of the Bush administration trying to blame the Louisiana governor and maybe the mayor – just before, that is, there was blame to slice and serve to various levels of government over hurricane preparation, levee repair, the regard for the poor – French writer and philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy continued his Atlantic series, “In the Footsteps of Tocqueville,” by considering this nation’s “relatively passive roles of politicians and citizens” when confronted with the inevitability of natural disaster.

His views, in the October issue of the Atlantic, went to press looking back at

a long history of hurricanes, tornadoes, floods and other cataclysms but before Katrina. In that way, they profit from a multitude of examples. They are valuable because they are context for the congressional investigations that were announced before Katrina’s dead could even be gathered, never mind buried.

Mr. Levy, for instance, wonders how Homestead, Fla., a dozen years after it was destroyed, the lives there torn apart by Hurricane Andrew, could be rebuilt with the same types of trailer parks and fragile-looking homes that were wiped out previously. “The America that hasn’t ceased to dream of the Star Wars missile-defense shield has the most effective warning and prevention systems in the world,” he writes. “But, strangely enough, it doesn’t use even a tenth of its capacity to keep the inhabitants of Homestead out of danger by strengthening building and insurance codes.”

He wants to know why the principle of precaution is so badly applied in places such as Homestead, which could stand for New Orleans or anywhere else exposed to the violence of nature, and though his answer, as all broad answers to overwhelming questions must, oversimplifies the subjects of his study, he is right to conclude that it is something more than the current administration’s ineptitude or its lack of funding for emergencies. “There is a culture of risk, stronger than the culture of security and the inclination to self-protection.

“There are the remains of a pioneering spirit that for decades, or rather centuries, has accommodated itself to a sense of temporary habitat, perched as it were on the side of the road, pressing forward with the frontier, and by definition precarious.”

Another way for investigators to examine New Orlean’s level of preparedness for Katrina and the possibility of flooding is to talk to the people who could leave when the evacuation of the city was ordered but who chose to stay. Some may have ridden out storms before and been doubtful; others may have wanted to protect family that was staying or protect property. Yet another possibility, writes Mr. Levy of storms generally, “No pity for our enemies, the Americans of the twenty-first century seem to be saying; no mercy for terrorists, certainly, or even for opponents of the country’s economic supremacy. But we’ll let nature take her best shot.”