With a pack of recently retired generals calling for his resignation, it looks more like a question of when than if Donald Rumsfeld will decide that he needs to spend more time with his family.

The unprecedented assault from military leaders adds powerful pressure to a growing sense that the war in Iraq has been mishandled from the start. Another sense, that the Iraq invasion was a mistake and a dreadful diversion from the more important task of capturing Osama bin Laden and breaking up his al-Qaida terror network, is also growing – although the dissident generals don’t all agree on that one.

The Bush administration’s response to the generals has been weak and unconvincing. The Pentagon’s complaint that they are only a tiny minority of more than 8,000 general officers is like saying that Martin Luther King was just one of thousands of black preachers. The half-dozen who have publicly criticized Mr. Rumsfeld include officers who recently held commands in the Iraq war.

True, some other generals have come forward to support Mr. Rumsfeld. But Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until last September, said former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki was “inappropriately criticized, I believe, for speaking out” in favor of a greatly expanded force for the Iraq invasion.

As for President Bush’s repeated insistence that Mr. Rumsfeld will remain secretary of defense, the president was merely doing what all presidents do, whether they truly intend to keep an official who is under fire or whether they eventually will quietly suggest that he resign.

Mr. Bush’s best reason for keeping him on the job is that his departure could be taken as an admission that the critics were right, that limiting the size of the invasion force, dismantling the old Iraqi military and failing to anticipate the insurgency were major mistakes. The entire administration is in trouble over the Iraq quagmire, and getting a new defense secretary might not help.

Countering this is the question of whether Mr. Rumsfeld can continue to be an effective wartime leader, since the barbs from retired generals are known to reflect considerable criticism among active duty officers. Keeping a secretary who is so discredited is a major weakness. American troops cannot afford to have an ineffective leader during a war, especially one as controversial and complex as the Iraq war. The Pentagon cannot have a secretary of diminished power at a time when the United States is stepping up its confrontation with Iran, perhaps to include military intervention.

Worse, if Mr. Bush comes to realize that – for the sake of his legacy and the future of Iraq – he should bring the troops home before his tenure ends, such a change in course would be difficult with a defense secretary so wedded to his past decisions and insistent in the veracity of his vision of the military and its capabilities.

Whether Mr. Rumsfeld stays at the Pentagon or goes is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Unless the criticism raised by the retired generals, and many other skeptics before them, can be directly countered by the administration, Mr. Rumsfeld’s power is so diminished that his vision and strategy no longer matter.