National Intelligence Director John Negroponte revealed recently that nearly 100,000 Americans are working in intelligence in this country and abroad. At a time when Osama bin Laden is still at large and Iran’s nuclear capabilities remain a mystery, it is appropriate to ask what all these people are doing and whether it is improving America’s security.

It’s been one year since an intelligence czar was put in charge of the 16 different spy agencies that include the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and lesser-known outfits such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Mr Negroponte has a budget of nearly $1 billion and a staff of 1,539 people, according to the Washington Post, to oversee the flock of now subordinate agencies.

The Post reported that his office inadvertently disclosed last fall that the total budget for the entire intelligence network is $44 billion. That figure, and the number of people working at the myriad intelligence agencies, had been a closely held secret.

Despite those lavish resources and with that huge staff, U.S. intelligence still has gaps that rival the CIA’s failure to put the clues together and head off the 9-11 terrorists.

For instance, we still don’t know where Osama bin Laden is hiding out after slipping though the fingers of the Pakistani and Afghan fighters. And we don’t know whether Iran is lying or telling the truth about the purpose and extent of its nuclear program. After Rep. Jane Harman of California, top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, got a classified briefing on Iran, she said that “what our government is claiming is information” could have passed for an Iranian disinformation campaign.

With the wars in Iran and Afghanistan continuing, and with plans being developed for a possible air strike against Iran, having clear, reliable intelligence is paramount.

That’s why the Government Accountability Office should be asked to review the country’s intelligence operations. Questions include whether useful information is being gathered and whether it is being appropriately shared and analyzed. A review should also look for areas where intelligence is missing, such as reliable sources of information about Iran’s current nuclear program.

With so many people working on intelligence, the United States must not again be embarrassed and harmed by the type miscalculations, such as not anticipating an insurgency, that have plagued the war in Iraq. Such an investigation could also shed light on where intelligence gathering and sharing ends and spinning for political gain begins.