The new Congress that begins service this month will be a wartime Congress. Public dissatisfaction with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan shaped the November election. Military leaders have expressed their concern about a military stretched beyond its capabilities. Hope may not be a strategy, but neither is cynicism or despair.

Shortly after the November election, New York Rep. Charles Rangel promptly floated his long-standing proposal to return to military conscription, the draft. Just as promptly, new House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made clear that the Democrats had not regained majority status to become the pro-draft party. As a matter of political strategy, Pelosi is pursuing the path of political popular wisdom. As a broader matter of national interest, however, it would be unfortunate if military conscription cannot be debated by the Congress and nation with the nonpartisan seriousness that it deserves. For as former Reagan administration Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb points out in a recent Foreign Affairs commentary: “The United States could probably not embark on another major troop deployment today without reinstating the draft. Even sending the number of troops needed to stabilize Afghanistan would be extremely taxing and would threaten to break the all-volunteer force.”

Hard debate over military policy reminds us that 90 years ago this spring, another Congress, the 65th, faced similar issues in one of the great periods of congressional activism on military matters. Some history is useful. The members of the 65th Congress had been elected in the 1916 election that returned Woodrow Wilson to the White House with a narrow electoral margin. Part of Wilson’s electoral success stemmed from his campaign slogan: “He kept us out of war” – namely the unprecedented, bloody World War I then in its third year in Europe. The members of the Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress that returned to Washington with President Wilson may have assumed that military matters would be light on their agenda.

Things change. Between November and April 1917, Germany announced it was resuming unrestricted submarine warfare against any shipping to England and France. Closer to home, a leaked German diplomatic message revealed German proposals to Mexico and Japan seeking their aid in war against the United States in return for the transfer of parts of the southwestern United States to Mexico. By April 1917, the new Congress’ first major decision was to follow President Wilson’s request to declare war on Germany.

What followed the declaration of war was a wealth of laws that put the United States on wartime footing. Increased taxation and federal bond sales raised enormous amounts of money for the war effort. Food, fuel and transportation were subject to substantial government regulation. Free expression was limited in ways that would seem shocking today. Few Americans were not directly touched by these laws. Many of these precedents continue to guide the nation a century later.

A most crucial legislative decision involved how to raise the Army that would be essential to the struggle for supremacy in western Europe. Initial suggestions of military conscription were received with hostility. With the exception of a modest part of Civil War mobilization, the American tradition was the volunteer military. That had been sufficient to win independence, displace the native population, fight wars with Britain, Mexico and Spain, and fight the Civil War. Conscription suggested the autocratic governments of Europe, particularly Germany. And yet, after several months of hard debate, Congress adopted a mobilization strategy that relied primarily on conscription.

Two factors helped persuade Congress to adopt the draft. First was the recognition of the immense seriousness of the task America had undertaken. This was war against the foremost military power in the world – Germany – as lawmaker after lawmaker recognized in public debate. Few lawmakers doubted that applying Civil War thinking to the Great War was a recipe for disaster. Further, the matters at stake were of the highest importance. Whether the war was defined as democracy versus autocracy, the defense of national honor, or the control of world trade, a German victory was of enormous consequence to the United States. No other matter of public policy came close.

Second, British advisers argued strongly not to let volunteer enthusiasm drive the war effort. Britain had done that in 1914 by sending thousands of its “best and brightest” volunteers to immediate and disorganized combat service where they were slaughtered. As a consequence, Britain was deprived of leaders needed to help train the far larger forces of volunteers and draftees that would have to fight the war. Unbelievable as it may seem from the perspective of 2007, one fear of 1917 was that the American volunteers would draw too heavily from the American elites and allow excessive “slacking” by the less privileged.

The draft law that resulted allowed the government to make “scientific” use of American manpower just as it did for natural resources and business enterprises. All American males age 21 to 30 were subject to registration for involuntary military service. Conscription put the total talents of young American males at the service of the armed forces and the war effort. At the first registration, over 91/2 million young Americans offered themselves for service.

Nearly a century later, Congress needs to debate and resolve some fundamental questions. First, how much armed force do we need? It may decide: only as much as can be raised by volunteers. If so, that may put mortal threats to Israeli, North Korean or Iranian nuclear weapons programs, regime change in Saudi Arabia or Chinese assertion of control over Taiwan beyond American military influence or solution. Congress should also ask: How good do we want our military to be? There is much that is praiseworthy about the all-volunteer force. But there was much extraordinary about the drafted forces that fought the World Wars, Korea and Vietnam. Finally, Congress should consider whether the burdens of military service should fall unequally on American citizens. Those are all difficult questions. But, to leave the draft as “beyond discussion” does not serve national needs.

Donald N. Zillman is president of the University of Maine at Presque Isle and Godfrey Professor of Law at the University of Maine Law School.