Teddy Roosevelt always gets credit for the adage “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” It is actually a West African proverb, and ends with an additional phrase – “and you’ll go far.”

Roosevelt first employed the saying in a battle with big-money interests over who should be superintendent of insurance when he was New York’s governor. But it was in foreign policy that TR became famous for combining finesse and muscle.

Roosevelt once justified a “soft” speech during a naval buildup against Venezuela: “If a man continually blusters, if he lacks civility, a big stick will not save him from trouble; but neither will speaking softly avail, if back of the softness there does not lie strength, power.”

Compare that subtlety to George W. Bush’s most famous words: his clumsy “axis of evil” speech in 2002 that included Iran at a time Iran was cooperating with U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

No one doubts Iraq, Iran and North Korea posed serious threats to international peace. But Bush’s rhetoric and lack of finesse in foreign affairs has diminished both respect for America’s word and the “stick,” the credibility of the United States, politically and militarily, in dealing with real challenges in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Iraq is far more unstable than before the Bush-Cheney war – a unilateral decision that has effectively ended American predominance in the Middle East. The outlook for North Korea is, fortunately, still enmeshed in six-party talks, and showing signs of progress. But Bush and Cheney will need to demonstrate a 180-degree shift in their management of foreign policy to deal with Iran successfully.

U.S.-Iranian relations are an extraordinarily complex, star-crossed conundrum. No one American president and no one set of Iranian leaders has been able to do anything but make matters worse in five decades. Misperceptions on both sides have combined with real missteps – and missed opportunities: the CIA role in the 1953 coup; Iran’s embassy seizure in 1979; U.S. support of the Shah; Iran’s frequent use of terrorism.

One need not mince words about Iran’s support of terrorism: the 444-day hostage taking, the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut that killed nearly 300 Americans, bombings of Israel’s embassy in Argentina, murders of Iranian Kurds in Germany, and support for many violent groups. From Iran’s perspective, the U.S. is guilty of support for Saddam’s Iraq in the brutal Iraq-Iran war, the shoot-down of an Iranian airliner, killing 290, and generally seeking to block Iran from regaining its historic, if self-inflated, role in the region.

The Bush administration now appears set on a new strategy to try to check Iran’s growing influence in Iraq – and the Middle East – and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Bush authorized aggressive measures against Iranian agents in Iraq. Another aircraft carrier was sent into the Persian Gulf. U.S. and moderate Arab leaders, mainly Sunni Arabs worried about Iran’s radicalism and pursuit of nuclear weapons, are trying to form a coalition to counter that threat – including containing oil prices that boost Iran’s woeful economy.

Bush has said the United States does not want war with Iran. And one must trust he means it. Given the strain on U.S. forces in Iraq and elsewhere, given the likelihood that an attack on nuclear sites would not succeed and only lead to greater Iranian determination, such an attack would be a grave mistake despite Iran’s relative military weakness.

There’s nothing wrong with military pressure, but only if in concert with full diplomatic and economic means, and as a last resort – something Bush minimized in Iraq. There can be no other path this time – and that’s why it is foolhardy to refuse to engage Iran and Syria in dialogue. Even Israeli leaders are now talking to Syria.

While most Bush-Cheney decisions have strengthened Iran’s position in the region, they did make one correct move: allowing European countries, hesitant to take a hard line with Iran, to lead talks on Iran’s nuclear programs. Progress followed, and even weak U.N. sanctions worry pragmatic Iranian leaders. Now skillful diplomacy is needed.

The administration needs to accept the Baker-Hamilton advice to engage Iran and Syria. The White House foolishly rejected readiness by Tehran in 2003 – just after the fall of Saddam’s statue – to discuss all issues. Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff to Secretary Powell, told the BBC: “Our refusal to talk to Iran for the last six years has allowed Iran to gain a strategic position in the region it could not have gained by itself.”

If Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger can see the strategic value of engaging China at the height of the Vietnam War, this White House should be able to see that dialogue is a far better course with Iran than escalation along a risky military path.

Secret talks with Iran backfired in the past – particularly Iran-contra during the Reagan administration. If Bush needs a trusted go-between, he can turn to Brent Scowcroft, his father’s national security adviser, who has recommended a far more nuanced policy on Iran. Scowcroft would not bluster; he would know how “to speak softly and carry a big stick, and (perhaps) go far.”

Fred Hill of Arrowsic was a foreign correspondent for The Baltimore Sun and worked on national security issues on Capitol Hill and in the State Department.