TALKING TO PYONGYANG

It is not surprising that hard-liners are upset about an agreement that North Korea will end its nuclear activities in exchange for food and energy assistance. The agreement, and the talks that made it possible, are a large and positive change in posture and approach for the Bush administration.

After years of labeling North Korea part of the “axis of evil” and ruling out direct talks to end Pyongyang’s nuclear buildup, the administration recently eased its stance. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill met with North Korean diplomats in Berlin last month. There they outlined what became the agreement that was endorsed by the members of the six-party talks that have been largely stalled for the past several years. The six parties are North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.

The agreement calls for North Korea, within 60 days, to shut down nuclear facilities at Yongbyon with international inspectors verifying the process. Pyongyang would then get food, energy and other aid worth 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Further nuclearization would follow.

The United States and North Korea also would discuss normalizing relations and begin the process of removing Pyongyang from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Separately, the United States agreed to resolve a dispute about North Korean money laundering and counterfeiting. In 2005, the United States froze North Korean bank accounts, charging the country with counterfeiting $100 bills. It encouraged other countries to do the same, further angering Pyongyang. The United States had said the financial issues were law enforcement matters and not part of the nuclear talks. Agreeing to resolve the financial dispute removed a roadblock to talks about the more important nuclear program.

This change, from general charges of bad behavior and threats to regional security to a one-on-one dialogue with a willingness to compromise, is a huge shift. Hard-liners in the Bush administration, such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and United Nations Ambassador John Bolton, were dead set against negotiating with regimes they said sponsor terrorism or threatened their neighbors. They favored threats to bring about regime change. Both men are no longer in office and the long-running battle between the departments of State and Defense appears to have tipped, at least as far as North Korea is concerned, toward State and its diplomatic approach.

As in the past, this agreement could collapse if either the United States or North Korea didn’t follow its terms or accuse the other of not doing so. However, it is an example of what is possible when two countries talk directly to one another with the aim of resolving a major conflict.