More than 35 years ago, the State Department established an unusual experiment in freedom of expression: an internal “dissent channel” to allow department officers to voice disagreement with current policies.

Driven by rising disagreement with U.S. policy in Vietnam, Secretary of State William Rogers declared that the dissent channel would offer officials below senior leadership an opportunity to express, without fear of reprisal, alternate or dissenting views and be assured they were heard by top policymakers. Ostensibly, the mechanism would enliven the policy process, if not alter actual policy.

Despite the best of intentions, the dissent channel has had a checkered history. Today, it is effectively moribund. In a few administrations, it has been widely used, in particular the Carter administration. More often, it has not, despite many controversial policies. Only five dissents were filed in 2002, the year of the buildup against Saddam Hussein; only seven in 2003 as the Bush administration embarked on a foolhardy invasion – one many State officials warned would be a grave mistake.

Citing privacy stipulations in the original foreign affairs manual, State officials offer very little information about this unusual channel beyond bare statistics.

The limited use of the dissent channel is not surprising, but does underline the silent pressure that can be exerted to dampen open opposition to policy. The most vigorous endorsement came in 1995 when Secretary of State Warren Christopher underlined his “strong interest in facilitating open, creative and uncensored dialogue on substantive and programmatic issues within the foreign affairs community.” Since that statement, no secretary has made such a clear endorsement. Colin Powell made passing reference once or twice; Condoleezza Rice has said nothing about it, and reliable sources say she has discouraged its use.

Four years ago last month, shortly before the U.S. attack on Iraq, I decided to file a letter of dissent to Secretary Powell. My office had no policymaking role, but in organizing war-gaming exercises and roundtable discussions, we did bring together senior decision-makers to look ahead at critical challenges, including Iraq. The main purpose of my dissent was to urge the administration to refocus its energies on the Arab-Israeli peace process, which Bush had put on the back burner, and not attack Iraq until there was a clear commitment to the peace process, more compelling evidence of WMD and terrorist ties, and broader allied support. The Bush administration’s tilt against Arab and Palestinian positions, I felt, was a huge mistake.

William Quandt, one of the most knowledgeable Middle East experts, observed in his 2005 book, “Peace Process”: “Rarely had any President gone so far in subcontracting American policy to an Israeli leader. It did not happen overnight, but by the third year of the Bush administration, the process was nearly complete.”

In a letter on March 18, 2003, I wrote: “This administration has allowed often ideological political motivations and a secondary, prospective threat to sideline what for decades has rightly been the principal focus of American policy: working towards peace and reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, with a conviction that only a full, constant and balanced engagement in the Middle East could help achieve that elusive peace.”

While confrontation with Saddam Hussein may be necessary at some future point if intelligence proves a WMD program, I added: The centerpiece of U.S. policy should remain the pursuit of peace and reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel and the Arab regimes.

“Instead, the administration has repeatedly allowed the worldwide, long-term interests and good will of the United States to be obscured by what is widely perceived as a misplaced priority – a preference for war against an admittedly brutal, but constrained regime over the hard work of peacemaking. Recent positive statements of commitment to a viable Palestinian state have been a case of too little, too late.”

While not an expert on the region, I noted that I had made many trips throughout the Middle East as a foreign correspondent, an assistant to a U.S. senator, and a member of the department, and had an appreciation of the complex challenges.

“I have listened to debates in the Knesset and heard tougher and more candid criticism of Israeli policy than in Congress. I have sat in Palestinian refugee camps and argued with angry Palestinian youths about American policies; only moments later to have many of them want to know how to get to the U.S. so they could study in our universities and make a better life.

“I agree that the events of September 11, 2001 and the growth of terrorism give new urgency to different strategies and tactics. Yet I have deep reservations about plunging into war without broader international support for both the use of force and for the immense costs of reconstruction. I have deep reservations about the staying power of the United States in a post-Saddam Iraq, with all its divisive factions and myriad rivalries.

“Our experiences in Afghanistan, Somalia and Lebanon suggest we may prevail in the initial military engagement, but underestimating the depth of divisions on the ground, we may begin to lose interest in the rebuilding of a fractious nation. And, just as major objectives in the war against terrorism are being realized, an attack on Iraq risks reviving the credibility and recruiting potential of terrorists and extremists.

“Reluctantly, I am convinced that ardent pursuit of war at this time, without more determined, considerably more balanced pursuit of the peace process, not only threatens lasting damage to our most important alliances but also is likely to generate greater instability in this volatile region. Equally, our rush to war risks tarnishing what millions around the world have considered the historic exceptionalism of the United States and the broad respect for our values and legitimacy as a model and a leader.”

Fred Hill of Arrowsic was a foreign correspondent for The Baltimore Sun, and later worked on national security issues on Capitol Hill and at the State Department. His e-mail is hill207@juno.com.