Scope of factions in Iran changes

Ibrahim B. strode to the front of the seminar room. Twenty U.S. government policymakers and analysts on the Middle East watched as he drew a large circle on the board and placed smaller circles, of varying size, within the larger circle.

A respected Iranian expert on Iran’s political landscape, Ibrahim B. outlined the diverse factions of power within Iran and their relative weight and links to one another. No one circle was placed at the center and none was significantly larger than others. There were at least 10 circles of substantial circumference among a total of 30 denoting moderate to traditionalist clerics, various politicians, the influential merchant class and several intelligence agencies.

This discussion occurred in Washington two years ago after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as president of the Islamic Republic. At the time, Ibrahim B. placed Ahmadinejad considerably away from the center but linked him to the two largest circles of all – the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the Revolutionary Guards commander, Rahim Safavi.

Ibrahim’s sketch would need updating today in the wake of several developments, notably the growing chaos in Iraq and continuing negotiations over Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Yet his outline would still have no center and leave unclear the precise locus of authority and decision-making in Iran. It would enlarge the circles for the Supreme Leader, President Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards commander.

Iran’s recent seizure of five prominent Iranian-American academics and nongovernmental officials highlights the growing strength of these hardline elements in Iran. It also underlines the difficult challenge facing the Bush administration as it searches for a coherent policy that can put a stop to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, encourage Iran to help bring stability to Iraq and to slow Iran’s drive to become a regional power.

A fierce struggle continues within the administration on how best to contain Iran and deal with its nuclear programs. The struggle pits the State Department under Secretary Rice and officials in other agencies who support diplomatic leverage and international sanctions, even limited dialogue, against a small group surrounding Vice President Cheney who pursue a more aggressive line that advocates “regime change” or military intervention.

It is unclear which group has the President’s ear. What is not debatable is that Bush/Cheney policies to date, including the disastrous strategic mistake to attack Iraq and its consequences, have emboldened hardliners in Iran.

Not surprisingly, U.S. failures in Iraq have been exploited by Iran, a neighbor with considerable interest in what happens in Iraq. And the U.S. military arrest of five Iranian officials – they call them diplomats, the U.S. calls them spies – triggered the seizure of the five Iranian Americans.

Many observers see the seizure of the Iranian-Americans, including Haleh Esfandiari, director of Mideast programs at the respected Wilson Center in Washington, as an attempt to set up a trade for the five Iranians. But that action, reminiscent of Iran’s 1979 hostage taking and subsequent isolation from the international community, is more significant. It is a telltale sign, experts say, of the struggle within Iran among different centers of power – and proof that a U.S. policy that calls for “regime change” only strengthens the hand of intransigents in Iran and increases risks of escalation and eventual confrontation with the United States.

“There is substantial opposition to the government in Tehran,” says one leading Iran scholar. “But, having seen what happened in 1979, people are much more reluctant to take to the streets today. This regime is vicious, and they are determined to prevent any protest for fear that it would get out of control. Thus, with the combination of apathy and [regime] willingness to use brute force, there is little chance of regime change.” He added: “They have a vested interest in continuing U.S. hostility – and would love to have the U.S. attack.”

The Bush/Cheney administration rejected a serious diplomatic overture from Iran’s leaders four years ago, when a convergence of interests, mainly shared desire for stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, would have served both countries. But after four years of ineffective U.S. presence in Iraq and setbacks for pro-American moderates in Lebanon and Palestine, Iran feels more confident about playing its own cards without needing to compromise with Washington.

With less than 18 months left in this administration, it is time for President Bush to decide on a clear strategy on Iran. Without backing off on the nuclear weapons issue, for which it has substantial support in Europe, and even Russia and China, the administration should make clear that it does not support “regime change” in Tehran – just a change in the regime’s behavior. And a shift in American behavior (ending support for overthrow of the regime) could set the stage for a serious dialogue on stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention terrorism, drugs and nuclear programs.

In the current state of affairs, the threat of U.S. intervention, along with the nuclear card, has allowed Ahmadinejad and hard-line forces to keep the focus on nationalist causes rather than their own dismal performance in office. Economic woes continue to plague the regime despite its vast income as the world’s second largest oil exporter.

The jailings of the Iranian-American citizens may yet get resolved. A judicial decision could lead to their release, just as the British sailors were released recently. If that happens, the moderates in Washington need to find a way to broaden the recent talks with Iran to all outstanding issues. The only loser in that scenario would be the very factions in Iran who are thriving on U.S. hostility today.

Fred Hill of Arrowsic was a foreign correspondent in Europe, Africa and the Middle East for The Baltimore Sun, and worked on national security issues on Capitol Hill and in the State Department. He can be reached at hill207@juno.com.