Do Fallon remarks reflect failed policy?

Adm. William Fallon’s resignation two weeks ago as commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East and Southwest Asia was inevitable after his careless remarks about the best strategy to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

It was also appropriate. No American government, where authority is based on civilian control of military leadership, could brook the admiral’s comments in which he spoke openly of his policy preference: diplomacy over saber-rattling.

But the incident masks two critical facts of life that are threatening to undermine American credibility in the world and, quite possibly, to endanger our to-date orderly system of government and decision-making.

First of all, tactless and foolish though Fallon’s remarks may have been, he is generally right to raise objections to the way George W. Bush and Dick Cheney conduct U.S. foreign policy. In two words: recklessly and disastrously.

If only another senior military officer, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, had had the courage to speak out about his private objections to Bush plans on Iraq, and resigned, it might have led to open dissent and a more balanced and effective strategy.

Fallon and the rest of us have witnessed all too tragically the way Bush and Cheney misused diplomatic pressure to hide their real intention to deal with Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction and nonexistent ties to terror networks. Despite the failure of the administration’s war in Iraq, now in its sixth year, Bush and Cheney are following a similar script in their campaign against Iran’s efforts to gain a nuclear weapons program. And virtually all of America’s top military establishment share Fallon’s strong doubt that war against Iran, against a third Muslim country, is a sensible option.

Make no mistake, Iran’s desire for a nuclear weapons program constitutes a serious foreign policy challenge. And the threat of military force should remain on the table. But Bush and Cheney don’t adhere to Theodore Roosevelt’s maxim: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” They seem to favor “Bring ’em on” and brandish a broken sword.

International efforts to block Iran’s nuclear efforts have made marginal progress. The U.N. Security Council has passed three sanctions resolutions to stop Iran’s reprocessing of uranium, yet Russia and China seem unwilling to back a tough stance.

My point is this, however: Fallon is a smart guy, considered one of our top strategic thinkers. Perhaps too smart for his own good. But a wise, senior officer with his experience doesn’t get so careless without a purpose. And the question remains: Do his statements reflect a real danger that Bush and Cheney, having failed miserably in Iraq, having not devoted enough resources to Afghanistan and counterterrorism, are ready to “double” their bet in their waning days by attacking Iran and hope “it works out”?

It is too soon to know. Ironically, we need to trust that if this White House gets any closer to another military adventure, enough senior officials and military leaders such as Fallon will speak out rather than follow Powell’s “good soldier” course.

The second worrying development highlighted by Fallon’s comments and resignation is equally disturbing. That is the growing militarization of American foreign policy.

Just look at the facts. Despite the “civilian” chain of command, the U.S. military is the overwhelmingly major force in national security decision-making. This is especially evident in three critical areas: resources, training and, increasingly, decision-making.

The resources given to the Department of Defense are so immense that no one, not even congressional leaders, can get a handle on actual spending.

Meanwhile, despite pressures to deal with nation building and hundreds of diverse diplomatic challenges around the world, spending for the State Department remains somewhere around 1 percent of all national security allocations.

Secondly, all training in strategic thinking in the United States is done at military war colleges, at Newport (Navy), Carlisle, Pa. (Army), etc. The State Department sends its career officers to the war colleges for training – although the senior leadership at State is almost always political appointees, who are supposed to be strategic thinkers ipso facto.

Lastly, decision-making. Along with Cheney, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld basically called the shots in the Iraq war buildup and planning. In arguing last summer for “the surge” in Iraq, effectively conceding his error on troop levels, Bush virtually declared Gen. David Petraeus president for Iraq policy.

The creeping authority of the military is evident in various regions of the world where ambassadors and military commanders have often vied for the No. 1 role. But with all the forces at their command, plus muddled decision-making in Washington, especially in the last two administrations, regional commanders such as Fallon have become the effective pro-consuls.

A former military leader, President Dwight Eisenhower warned about the growing influence of “the military-industrial complex.” But Fallon is likely to be paired with another respected general, Douglas MacArthur. Whereas MacArthur was fired by President Harry Truman for advocating a military strike against China during the Korean War, Fallon may be remembered as “the anti-MacArthur,” the senior military man who too publicly suggested that Bush and Cheney are not defining an effective diplomatic strategy to deal with Iran.

Fred Hill of Arrowsic was a foreign correspondent for The Baltimore Sun and worked on national security issues on Capitol Hill and in the State Department. He may be reached at hill207@juno.com.