A recent New York Times article highlighted what the writers called an epic battle between two leading experts on terrorism, Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University, and Marc Sageman a psychiatrist and former CIA officer.

According to the article, Sageman’s latest book, “Leaderless Jihad,” argues that al-Qaida as an organization is a minor threat today, that the most serious threat is the angry “bunches of guys” who are building small, localized terrorist networks around the world. Hoffman, who reviewed Sageman’s book in Foreign Affairs, believes al-Qaida remains a grave threat, and due to the Bush administration’s failure to go after it seriously and invade Iraq instead, has reconstituted itself and is still capable of a major attack.

In truth, the differences between Hoffman and Sageman are more nuanced, and the article sets up a huge “either/or” conflict that doesn’t exist. What the Times’ article barely mentions, however, is a much more serious issue: this administration’s failure to put together a serious, well-organized and long-term strategy to deal with both threats – al-Qaida’s potential to strike again and the more diffuse challenge of undercutting jihadist appeal and containing “local” networks.

Not long after Sept. 11, then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice tried to deflect criticism that the Bush administration had been asleep on the job when she said “no one could have imagined” an attack such as the use of airliners flown into the World Trade Center.

While the Clinton administration could have done much more to counter the growing terrorist threat, this administration had been in office for eight months and had received far more explicit intelligence warnings that a major attack was imminent.

Rice’s remark was far-fetched for several reasons. Terrorists had attacked the World Trade Center in 1993. The principal bomber, Ramzi Yousef, talked of felling the towers as he was flown back to the U.S. for prosecution. Intelligence reports also had uncovered plots to use airplanes against critical landmarks.

As long ago as 1948, though referring to possible attack by a newly nuclear Soviet Union, the essayist E.B.White wrote of New York: “The city, for the first time, is destructible. A single flight of planes no bigger than a wedge of geese can quickly end this island fantasy, burn the towers …”

The blunt fact is that the Bush administration failed to keep its eye on the ball after a successful and widely supported intervention to take down the al-Qaida base in Afghanistan and did not devote sufficient resources to bring stability to Afghanistan. Instead they invaded Iraq because, in my view, Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and adviser Karl Rove decided it would be a “cakewalk,” provide a clear victory before the 2004 election and ensure Republican majorities far into the future.

The Bush administration has channeled plenty of money to fight terrorism. And progress has been made. Several senior U.S. leaders recently said al-Qaida is on the run. Although not directly related to the administration’s so-called “war on terror,” one positive development has been growing criticism of the use of terror by leading Islamic clerics and jihad theorists.

But many experts still regard the administration’s efforts as piecemeal and poorly targeted. Although the administration has developed a comprehensive strategy, Hoffman sees its implementation as uneven and badly remiss in blunting the appeal of terrorism.

One of the most important tasks of the next administration will be to repair the public diplomacy side of strategic communications. Today, flawed policies and political posturing obscure the openness, diversity and innovation of American (and Western) societies, failing to trump the medieval practices of men in caves who behead prisoners and use children as suicide bombers. Another seasoned observer notes: “We have arrived in the unenviable position of not being liked, not being respected and not being feared.”

Hoffman, author of a respected book, “Inside Terrorism,” says the crucial elements are both military force and an in-depth, long-term, interagency plan that embraces political reform, economic development and complex information operations. He noted in a recent interview that a strategic communications plan designed to counter al-Qaida propaganda still doesn’t exist. Many offices work on counter-terrorism messages but the government still lacks a clear chain of command with a top-ranking leader at the National Security Council to coordinate this critical dimension.

Despite expanded media programming in the Middle East, he noted, there is insufficient effort to counter terrorist activity on the Internet – its preferred medium for propaganda and recruitment.

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles,” Hoffman quotes the Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu. He adds: “What remains missing seven years into this struggle is a thorough, systematic and empirical understanding of our enemy.”

Without that perspective we will always remain on the defensive.

Fred Hill of Arrowsic was a foreign correspondent for The Baltimore Sun and worked on national security issues for the State Department. He can be reached at hill207@juno.com.