Why would China not permit Albert Einstein’s Jewish heritage to be discussed or highlighted in an exhibit from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem scheduled to open next September in five Chinese cities? Does this episode signify a major crisis between Jerusalem and Beijing? (“Israel Cancels Einstein Exhibit in China Over ‘Insult’ to Jews”, Washington Post, July 29)

The objects in this exhibit were deposited by Einstein, under the terms of his will, in the archives of the Hebrew University, an institution which he helped found in the 1920s. According to media reports from Israel, China’s Ministry of Culture insisted that three facts about the famous physicist be removed before the exhibit could open: that Einstein was Jewish; that he backed the creation of a Jewish state; and that Israel’s first prime minister David Ben Gurion invited Einstein to become Israel’s second president, a position which the elderly professor declined. Amir Sagi, a spokesman for Israel’s Beijing embassy, said that Israel had no choice but to cancel the long-planned exhibit since “we can not accept this change in the records of history. This is an insult to the Jewish people and to the State of Israel.”

The exhibit itself was the brainchild of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who visited Israel in 2000 and proposed it to his hosts. How could plans for such an event derail so rapidly? According to the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot, China was trying to “de-Judaize Einstein so as not to spark Arab anger.” There is no question that a high-profile exhibit from Israel would evoke protest from Arab embassies in Beijing and around the world. But until now China has been willing to “take the punches” from the Arab side while cultivating its relations with Israel. Jiang Zemin’s visit was a case in point. He spent nearly a week in Israel, only two days in Egypt, and China withstood any diplomatic fallout from that prioritization.

Why was China willing to “take the hits” from the Arabs two years ago but not now? The answer lies in the recent history of Sino-Israeli relations. When the exhibit was first proposed Sino-Israeli relations were the warmest they had been in years. Israel had terminated arms sales to Taiwan, thereby clearing the way for China and Israel to exchange ambassadors and for Jiang’s visit. Non-stop air service had begun between Beijing and Tel Aviv. A Sino-Israeli Dry Lands Research Center maintained joint research projects in China’s westernmost province.

Judaic Studies programs were in place in universities in Harbin, Kaifeng, Nanjing, and Shanghai. A Tel Aviv-based “Israel-China Friendship Society” highlighted these and other activities in its newsletter Israel-China Voice of Friendship.

The high point of Sino-Israeli relations, in sheer dollar value, was Israel Aircraft Industry’s multi-million dollar contract in the late 1990s to sell China its “Phalcon” aerial reconnaissance aircraft. The sale was aborted in August 2000 under intense pressure from the United States, which feared China would use the aircraft against Taiwan. In February 2002 Israel paid China a reported $350 million as compensation and on March 25 Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres met his Chinese counterpart Tang Jiaxuan in Beijing to make amends.

From the Chinese point of view, the forced cancellation of the Einstein exhibit may be but a mild rebuke of Israel for the vast delays and difficulties China now faces in creating or purchasing an alternative aerial reconnaissance system. While the Phalcon negotiations were ongoing, China was willing to put up with a degree of Arab chastisement. Now that deal has fallen through, Arab-Israeli tensions have heightened, and China no longer feels the need to put up with and try to deflect the barrage of Arab criticism that would inevitably follow an exhibit highlighting Einstein’s ties with the Jewish state.

Does this episode signify a major crisis in Sino-Israeli relations? Probably not. There remains a commonality of interests between the two countries. Both China and Israel share deep concern over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Both remain committed to cutting-edge technological cooperation. Almost simultaneously with the cancellation of the Phalcon deal and the Einstein impasse, Israel and China signed an agreement of approximately equal value to the Phalcon contract wherein Israeli-made HK 1 and 2 satellites will broadcast the 2008 Beijing Olympic games.

The days are probably over when the Chinese, acutely aware of Einstein’s Jewishness, would jointly praise “Marx, Freud, and Einstein” when welcoming Israeli delegations. And it is unlikely that China will soon feature Einstein on a second Chinese postage stamp [Scott #1468 was issued in 1979]. Nevertheless Einstein’s portrait continues to hang in Chinese schools and museums, alongside other world-famous scientists and authors, as examples of universal rather than specifically nationalistic excellence. The “Einstein flap” will more than likely recede as a mere blip in the positive context of Sino-Israeli relations.

Jonathan Goldstein, a summer resident of Glenburn, is a research associate of Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for East Asian Research. His books include China and Israel, 1948-98: A Fifty Year Retrospective [Praeger, 1999] and The Jews of China [M.E. Sharpe, 2000].