President George Bush’s argument for his Iraq policy, offered in a slightly refined version Monday in Cincinnati, was a calm restatement of previous information and a reassurance that the United States would first attempt to gather allies before acting unilaterally. But, curiously, it was also almost purely defensive – an odd position for a leader who is advocating for a pre-emptive war.

As expected, the president set high standards for Iraq to avoid a U.S. attack – it must destroy all weapons of mass destruction, end support for terrorism, stop trade outside the food-for-oil program, account for all Gulf War personnel. War was regrettable, he said, but necessary unless these steps were completed because Saddam Hussein presented a unique combination of evil and the weaponry to exert evil. This was similar to his comment to the United Nations.

What was noteworthy, however, was how he framed his argument. The various sections of the president’s speech began with the observations of people who oppose his policies. These included the following: “Some have argued we should wait.” “Some citizens wonder, ‘After 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it now?'” “Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon.” “Some believe we can address this danger by simply resuming the old approach to inspections …”

The president’s decision to respond to comments by critics was welcome and a sign that his administration is not as aloof as sometimes portrayed, although certainly polls showing less and less support for a war with Iraq made this decision easier. Nevertheless, his new responses to fundamental questions about a war for which he already is positioning troops should be disturbing to anyone. The administration is committed to war; it seems caught by surprise that it had to go back to the public and explain why it was committed.

This need for a defensive speech now illustrates the problem with the strategy of a pre-emptive strike, which in this case means deciding to attack and then finding reasons to justify it. Just as the president miscalculated in his expectation that the tragedy of Sept. 11, 2001, would reinforce public support for unilateral action, so too would he feel abandoned by even the tepid international support for an attack should any of a hundred unexpected events occur in Iraq. Aggressors in speech and in war must meet a higher standard to retain allies.

The risk the president took with his early rhetoric failed to pay off, and he now is trying to make amends; the United States is heading for war with a similarly risky strategy in which failure carries a heavier price.