The New Year’s Day implementation of tougher luggage screening at America’s airports, though still a hassle-filled work in progress, is a remarkable achievement by the federal Transportation Security Administration in substantially meeting one of Congress’ toughest anti-terrorism mandates. The alert issued Monday by the FBI to law-enforcement agencies throughout the nation regarding five men of Middle Eastern origin with terrorist ties who may have sneaked into the country is, despite the disturbing implications, a welcome sign that inter-agency cooperation ordered by the White House actually has improved since the Sept. 11 attacks.

The announcement by U.S. intelligence officials that they have identified 15 cargo freighters around the world that are owned or controlled by al-Qaida has little to offer on the upside. It’s good to know that these vessels, called “ships of concern,” have been identified, but this information only underscores the security difficulties posed by a global industry largely unregulated and famously secretive.

There are some 120,000 merchant ships worldwide; the ownership of many is hidden within an elaborate corporate shell game based upon the lack of oversight offered by many of the world’s governments. While the original intent of this centuries-old ownership and registration charade was to take advantage of a particular country’s industry-friendly taxation, safety, environmental and labor policies, these practices offer enormous opportunities to modern-day terrorists, whether the cargo is operatives, money or a dirty bomb. With more than 100 commercial cargo ports in the United States receiving more than 51,000 foreign-registered ships each year, handling 1.1 billion tons of goods in 11.5 million containers, the scope of this vulnerability is stunning.

Intelligence agencies have improved their ability to track suspicious ships by satellites or surveillance planes, but the trail often is lost after the ship enters a port to get a new paint job, a new name and a new set of ownership and registration documents. As for the crew, the true identities of those serving on these ships and going ashore at U.S. ports can easily be masked by the same shadowy procedures. Stowaways are controlled only to the extent the ships’ owners – the true owners – care to.

Currently, the most effective tools U.S. intelligence has to track cargo, ships and seamen are large databases that could indicate “anomalies” – such as a fishing vessel reporting it caught fish not found in waters it has visited, or a port visit that doesn’t jibe with the cargo. Within weeks after Sept. 11, Navy intelligence began striking data-sharing agreements with dozens of allied navies and enlisted tipsters among port managers across the globe, as well as shipping agents, crew manning supervisors and seafarers unions. The Coast Guard also acted quickly to establish new rules for medium- and large-size ships. Ninety-six hours before reaching a U.S. port, they now must provide data about their cargo, the names and passport numbers of the crew, the ship’s corporate details and recent port calls.

These are necessary measures, but they are precisely the type of measures made vulnerable and possibly ineffective by the international status quo of allowing the global shipping industry to operate with intentional deception. The current strategy of “pushing the borders out” – that is, of tracking and inspecting ships while at sea – can only go so far. Congress and the White House now must push for the necessary reforms in the ports and countries of origin.