President Bush has rightly chosen conciliation rather than bluster and coercion in dealing with the prickly issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons plans. In a policy shift designed to restart the stalled six-nation talks, he said he was willing to commit the United States to a written guarantee not to attack North Korea in exchange for steps by Pyongyang toward abandoning its nuclear arms programs. Mr. Bush joined President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea in calling for a fresh round of talks “at an early date” and urged North Korea to refrain from any action that could exacerbate the crisis.

While details are still vague, this subtle but significant policy change amounts to a clear but unacknowledged rebuff to the administration hard-liners who see no merit in any negotiations with the reclusive dictatorship. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice seemed to take a middle ground. She said the North Koreans would have to be “willing, able and verifiably capable of carrying out the obligations that they undertake.” But she added: “We are not going to go in all guns blazing and say ‘Take it or leave it, this is it.'”

The fresh Bush approach could conceivably develop into a move toward considering some version of a four-stage peace plan that North Korea presented at the opening round of talks in Beijing in August. The proposal, published on the North Korean Web site, called for successive sets of simultaneous concessions by the two sides. In the first stage, the United States would resume its shipments of heavy fuel oil and humanitarian food aid, while North Korea would “declare its will to scrap its nuclear program.” In stage two, North Korea would “refreeze” its nuclear programs and permit international monitoring, while the United States would conclude a “nonaggression treaty” with North Korea and compensate it for the loss of electricity caused by suspension of construction of two promised nuclear power reactors. Other steps would follow, leading to cessation of North Korea’s missile exports in return for opening diplomatic relations.

Finally, the frozen nuclear plants would be dismantled.

A sticking point remains Pyongyang’s insistence on a formal nonaggression treaty, which would require Senate confirmation. Still, a written guarantee could allay Pyongyang’s anxiety over being tagged as part of an “axis of evil” and implicitly threatened with pre-emptive attack by the United States.

Slowly and hesitantly, the two countries seem to have turned toward a peaceful resolution of a dangerous nuclear crisis.